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CHAPTER	ONE	
	
INTRODUCING	THE	STUDY	
	
	
1.1	 Introduction	
The	concept	of	the	illicit	movement	of	money	aimed	at	concealing	illegal	activities	and	evading	
taxes	is	not	new.	However,	the	global	community	first	used	the	term	“illicit	financial	flows”	
(IFFs)	in	the	1990s	and	originally	associated	it	with	capital	flight.1	The	globalisation	of	financial	
markets	and	the	increasing	ease	with	which	individuals	and	companies	transact	across	borders	
have	led	to	a	substantial	increase	in	IFFs.2	Despite	their	growing	economic	and	political	
significance,	academics	and	international	institutions	are	yet	to	formulate	an	agreed	definition	
of	IFFs.	One	of	the	common	definitions	is	that	of	Global	Financial	Integrity	(GFI),	which	
describes	IFFs	as	the	illegal	movement	of	illegal	or	legal	money	meant	for	an	illegal	purpose.3	
The	Report	of	the	High	Level	Panel	(HLP)	on	IFFs	from	Africa	estimates	that	the	
continent	loses	more	than	US$50	billion	annually	through	IFFs.4	The	HLP	Report	notes	that	
abusive	commercial	practices,	transnational	criminal	activities	and	corruption	are	the	main	
causes	of	IFFs	in	Africa.5	It	estimates	that	commercial	activities	account	for	65	per	cent	of	IFFs,	
criminal	activities	for	30	per	cent	and	corruption	for	around	5	per	cent.6	Kenya	has	lost	
substantial	amounts	of	money	to	IFFs.	In	the	period	2002-2006,	the	country	lost	an	estimated	
US$686	million	annually	to	IFFs.7	
These	estimates	may	be	too	low,	since	the	study	of	IFFs	involves	complex	legal	and	
economic	concepts	that	make	it	difficult	to	determine	the	precise	volumes	of	IFFs.	Nonetheless,	
the	current	estimates	show	that	IFFs	are	substantial	and	growing	at	an	alarming	rate.	IFFs	
reduce	the	ability	of	African	countries	to	achieve	their	development	goals.	HE	Kwesi	Quartey,	
                                                
1	 World	Bank	(2017),	available	at	http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialsector/brief/illicit-financial-
flows-iffs	(visited	9	March	2018).	
2	 Kar	&	LeBlanc	(2013)	at	iii.	
3	 GFI	(2018),	available	at	http://www.gfintegrity.org/issue/illicit-financial-flows/	(visited	9	March	2018).	
4	 HLP	(2015)	at	13.	
5	 HLP	(2015)	at	24.	
6	 HLP	(2015)	at	24.	
7	 Kar	&	Cartwright-Smith	(2008)	at	67.	
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Deputy	Chairperson	of	the	African	Union	Commission,	has	stated	that:	“IFFs	are	a	huge	drain	on	
Africa’s	resources,	including	tax	revenues,	and	hinder	the	level	of	savings	required	to	address	
key	development	issues”.8	
This	research	paper	attempts	an	evaluation	of	the	role	of	anti-corruption	laws	and	
institutions	in	curbing	IFFs	from	Kenya.	It	gives	a	contextual	background	of	IFFs	in	Kenya	and	
their	impact	on	development	and	good	governance.	It	analyses	the	relationship	between	
corruption	and	IFFs	and	discusses	the	role	of	national	and	international	anti-corruption	laws	
and	institutions	in	curbing	IFFs	from	Kenya.	Finally,	it	recommends	measures	which	Kenya	may	
adopt	to	enhance	the	efficiency	of	its	anti-corruption	tools	in	curbing	IFFs.	
1.2	 Contextual	Background	of	IFFs	in	Kenya	
This	section	discusses	the	contextual	background	of	IFFs	in	Kenya.	It	considers	the	three	sources	
of	IFFs	as	identified	by	the	HLP,	namely,	commercial	activities,	criminal	activities	and	
corruption.	
1.2.1	 Abusive	Commercial	Practices	in	Kenya	
Abusive	business	practices	are	a	major	source	of	IFFs	in	Kenya.	Businesses	engaging	in	abusive	
commercial	practices	aim	at	dodging	tax	authorities	and	concealing	their	wealth.	These	
practices	include	activities	such	as	tax	evasion,	aggressive	tax	avoidance,	transfer	mispricing	
and	trade	misinvoicing.	Multinational	corporations	(MNCs)	are	major	culprits	in	this	regard.	Civil	
society	has	raised	concerns	about	MNCs	lowering	their	tax	liabilities	in	the	countries	in	which	
they	operate.9	
“Abusive	tax	avoidance	and	evasion	are	one	of	the	major	factors	influencing	creative	
accounting	practice	among	private	companies	in	Kenya.”10	Tax	evasion	is	an	explicit	violation	of	
a	country’s	tax	laws,	where	a	taxpayer	hides	income	or	information	from	tax	authorities	to	
reduce	his	tax	liability.11	By	contrast,	tax	avoidance	is	not	an	explicit	violation	of	the	law.	It	is	a	
                                                
8	 Quartey	(2018),	available	at	https://au.int/en/speeches/20180508/statement-deputy-chairperson-high-
level-meeting-consortium-stem-illicit-financial	(visited	9	June	2018).	
9	 United	Nations	Economic	Commission	of	Africa	(UNECA)	(2018)	at	2.	
10	 Kamau	et	al	(2012)	at	83.	
11	 OECD	(2018),	available	at	http://www.oecd.org/ctp/glossaryoftaxterms.htm	(visited	12	March	2018).	
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dishonest	tax	practice	whereby	taxpayers	take	advantage	of	loopholes	in	tax	laws	to	reduce	
their	tax	liability.12	Such	practices	contradict	the	intention	of	a	country’s	tax	legislation.13	
Kenya’s	Tax	Procedure	Act	of	2015	(TPA)	explicitly	prohibits	all	tax	avoidance	and	evasion	
practices.14	Prior	to	the	enactment	of	the	TPA,	Kenyan	courts	acknowledged	the	rights	of	a	
taxpayer	to	take	advantage	of	loopholes	in	tax	laws.	Justice	Korir,	in	the	Bata	Shoe	Company	
case,	said:	“Payment	of	tax	is	an	obligation	imposed	by	the	law.	It	is	not	a	voluntary	activity.	
That	being	the	case,	a	taxpayer	is	not	obliged	to	pay	a	single	coin	more	than	is	due	to	the	
taxman”.15	
Transfer	mispricing	occurs	when	an	international	company	takes	advantage	of	its	
multiple	structures	to	shift	profits	across	jurisdictions.16	The	methods	of	transfer	mispricing	are	
intentional	falsification	of	information,	non-declaration	of	financial	assets,	trade	mispricing,	
accounting	fraud,	bribing	of	tax	officials	and	abuse	of	tax	incentives	by	falsely	claiming	
eligibility.17	Kenya	loses	over	Ksh	43	billion	annually	in	unpaid	taxes	due	to	transfer	mispricing.18	
In	2014,	the	Kenya	Revenue	Authority	determined	that	Karuturi	Limited,	an	India-based	MNC,	
used	transfer	mispricing	to	avoid	paying	the	government	nearly	Ksh	946	million	in	tax.19	
Trade	misinvoicing	refers	to	the	falsification	of	the	price,	quality	and	quantity	values	of	
traded	goods	for	several	reasons.20	It	could	include	the	desire	to	evade	customs	duties	and	
domestic	levies	with	the	intention	of	exporting	foreign	exchange	abroad.21	Kenya	is	one	of	the	
jurisdictions	in	the	world	in	which	it	is	easiest	to	incorporate	an	anonymous	shell	company.22	
This	means	that	traders	engaging	in	misinvoicing	have	ready	avenues	through	which	to	disguise	
                                                
12	 Chowla	&	Falcao	(2016)	at	12.		
13	 OECD	(2018),	available	at	http://www.oecd.org/ctp/glossaryoftaxterms.htm	(visited	12	March	2018).	
14	 Sections	85	&	97	of	the	TPA.	
15	 Republic	v	Kenya	Revenue	Authority	Ex	parte	Bata	Shoe	Company	(Kenya)	Limited	(2014)	at	11.	
16	 HLP	(2015)	at	27.	
17	 Waris	(2017)	at	7.	
18	 Michira	(2014),	available	at	https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000107763/revealed-
how-karuturi-got-away-with-denying-kenya-millions-of-shillings-in-taxes	(visited	20	May	2018).	
19	 International	Trade	Centre	(2014),	available	at	http://www.intracen.org/itc/blog/market-insider/Tax-
authorities-investigate-flower-farms-in-Kenya/	(visited	20	May	2018).	
20	 HLP	(2015)	at	27.	
21	 HLP	(2015)	at	27.	
22	 Baker	et	al	(2014)	at	23.	
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and	utilise	their	illicit	funds.23	GFI’s	study	shows	that	in	the	period	2002-2011,	Kenya	lost	$9.64	
billion	due	to	trade	misinvoicing.24	
The	funds	originating	from	these	abusive	commercial	practices	qualify	as	illegally	earned	
funds.	The	transfer	of	these	funds	abroad	is	an	example	of	the	illicit	flow	of	funds	aimed	at	
avoiding	tax	obligations.	These	practices	lead	to	substantial	illicit	outflows	from	Kenya,	which	
have	affected	negatively	the	country’s	development	goals.	
1.2.2	 Transnational	Criminal	Activities	in	Kenya	
Incidents	of	transnational	organised	crime	are	still	prevalent	in	Kenya,	despite	the	country	
being	a	signatory	of	the	UN	Convention	on	Transnational	Organised	Crime	and	its	additional	
Protocols	(UNCTOC).	Examples	of	such	transnational	crimes	being	committed	in	the	country	are	
human	trafficking,	drug	trafficking,	trafficking	in	wildlife	products	and	money	laundering.	
It	has	been	said	that:	
The	Eastern	Africa	region	is	attractive	to	international	drug	trafficking	syndicates	as	
they	are	quick	to	exploit	the	non-existent	or	ineffective	border	controls,	the	limited	
cross-border	and	regional	co-operation	and	serious	deficiencies	in	the	criminal	
justice	systems.25	
In	Kenya,	international	drug	trafficking	gangs	manage	most	of	the	cocaine	and	heroin	trafficked	
into	and	through	the	country.26	These	networks	involve	West	Africans	and	Kenyans	with	strong	
links	to	the	police	and	the	judiciary.	
Kenya	is	a	source,	transit	and	destination	country	for	victims	of	human	trafficking.27	It	is	
a	source	of	cheap	labour	for	countries	in	other	regions,	particularly	the	Middle	East.	
Unsuspecting	Kenyan	victims	are	recruited	by	legal	or	illegal	employment	agencies	with	the	
promise	of	well-paid	jobs,	only	for	them	to	be	exploited	physically	and	sexually.28	Kenya	is	a	
regional	transit	hub	for	both	voluntary	and	trafficked	migrants	in	East	Africa	en	route	to	South	
                                                
23	 Baker	et	al	(2014)	at	23.	
24	 Baker	et	al	(2014)	at	19.	
25	 UNODC	(2018),	available	at	https://www.unodc.org/easternafrica/en/illicit-drugs/drug-trafficking-
patterns.html	(visited	20	May	2018).	
26	 Gastrow	(2011)	at	3.	
27	 IOM	(2015)	at	16.	
28	 US	Department	of	State	(2017)	at	234.	
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Africa.29	It	is	a	destination	country	for	sex	tourists	who	exploit	the	local	population,	especially	
children.30	In	the	Kenyan	coastal	town	of	Mombasa,	girls	between	the	ages	of	10	and	15	are	
sold	against	their	will	for	about	US$600.31	Kenya	is	the	largest	market	for	counterfeit	goods	and	
contraband	in	East	Africa.32	The	Kenya	Association	of	Manufacturers	estimates	that	the	
counterfeit	economy	of	the	country	is	worth	US$1.2	billion	annually.33	
Tourism	is	one	of	Kenya’s	leading	foreign	exchange	earners.	The	country	is	home	to	
diverse	and	unique	wildlife	species.	Unfortunately,	Kenya’s	wildlife	is	under	increasing	threat	
from	the	activities	of	international	criminal	networks.	“Reports	of	illegal	trade	of	endangered	
wildlife	trophies	intercepted	while	in	transit	are	common,	with	the	Mombasa	port	identified	as	
a	key	conduit.”34	
Money	laundering	is	an	important	element	of	transnational	criminal	activities	aimed	at	
concealing	and	protecting	the	source	and	use	of	criminal	proceeds.	“It	is	also	important	
because	of	the	opportunities	for	survival	and	expansion	it	affords	organised	criminal	groups.”35	
Criminals	may	use	the	illegal	proceeds	to	maintain	expensive	lifestyles,	to	re-investment	in	
criminal	activity	or	to	fund	terrorist	activities.	The	2016	report	by	the	Bureau	for	International	
Narcotics	and	Law	Enforcement	Affairs	on	International	Narcotics	Control	Strategy	(INCSR)	
indicates	that	Kenya	is	vulnerable	to	money	laundering.36	The	laundered	proceeds	are	derived	
from	both	national	and	international	criminal	operations,	such	as	organised	crime,	cybercrime,	
corruption	and	trade	invoice	manipulation.37	Criminal	networks	in	Kenya	have	established	links	
with	Al-Shabaab	and	taken	advantage	of	the	porous	Kenya-Somali	border	to	smuggle	people,	
counterfeit	goods	and	weapons.	“Kenya’s	proximity	to	Somalia	makes	it	also	an	attractive	
location	for	the	laundering	of	certain	proceeds	related	to	piracy	and	a	financial	facilitation	hub	
                                                
29	 IOM	(2015)	at	16.	
30	 US	Department	of	State	(2017)	at	234.	
31	 Gastrow	(2011)	at	7.	
32	 Gastrow	(2011)	at	4.	
33	 Lindijer	(2016),	available	at	https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/13/kenya-is-run-by-mafia-
style-cartels-says-chief-justice	(visited	24	August	2018).	
34	 Nduta	(2018),	available	at	https://africasustainableconservation.com/2018/04/11/kenya-illegal-wildlufe-
trade/	(visited	24	August	2018).	
35	 Wright	(2006)	at	68.	
36	 US	Department	of	State	(2016)	at	156.	
37	 US	Department	of	State	(2016)	at	156.	
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for	the	Somalia-based	terrorist	group	Al-Shabaab.”38	
Although	the	main	purpose	of	these	activities	might	not	be	to	generate	IFFs,	they	
contribute	substantially	to	such	flows	because	they	are	intended	to	hide	the	illegal	proceeds	
from	revenue	authorities	and	law	enforcement	agencies.39	
1.2.3	 Corruption	in	Kenya	
Though	criminal	and	illicit	commercial	activities	cause	substantial	IFFs	from	Kenya,	corruption	is	
a	major	driver	of	these	outflows.	The	2017	Transparency	International	Corruption	Perceptions	
Index	ranked	Kenya	at	143	out	of	180	countries,	with	the	180th	place	signifying	the	most	corrupt	
country.40	Corruption	has	permeated	the	country’s	private	and	public	sectors.	The	most	
affected	public	institutions	are	the	police,	the	public	procurement	process,	the	revenue	
authorities,	the	public	administration	and	the	judiciary.41	
Kenya	is	not	short	of	grand	corruption	scandals	that	have	caused	or	encouraged	IFFs.	
The	Goldenberg	corruption	scandal	is	a	good	illustration	of	this.	It	involved	a	scheme	according	
to	which	Goldenberg	International	would	“export”	fictitious	gold	and	diamonds	and	the	Kenyan	
government	would	“compensate”	it	for	earning	foreign	exchange	from	these	fictitious	exports.	
It	is	estimated	that	the	scandal	cost	Kenya	10	per	cent	of	its	gross	domestic	product,	despite	
the	export	of	minimal	or	no	gold	and	diamonds.42	More	recently,	the	counterfeit	sugar	scandal	
showed	how	corruption	can	fuel	illicit	trade	in	Kenya.	This	scandal	involved	smugglers	colluding	
with	corrupt	officials	of	the	Kenya	Revenue	Authority	and	Kenya	Bureau	of	Standards	to	flood	
the	Kenyan	market	with	illegally	imported	sugar	unfit	for	human	consumption.43	The	
government	estimates	the	contraband	sugar	to	be	worth	US$17.8	million.44	
                                                
38	 US	Department	of	State	(2016)	at	157.	
39	 HLP	(2015)	at	32.	
40	 Transparency	International	(2017),	available	at	
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017	(visited	8	March	2018).	
41	 Martini	(2012)	at	4.	
42	 Letete	&	Sarr	(2017)	at	6.		
43	 Okoye	(2018),	available	at	https://www.diplomaticourier.com/kenyas-latest-scandal-reveals-the-bitter-	
taste-of-corruption/	(visited	24	August	2018).	
44	 Okoye	(2018),	available	at	https://www.diplomaticourier.com/kenyas-latest-scandal-reveals-the-bitter-
taste-of-corruption/	(visited	24	August	2018).	
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The	prevalence	of	corruption	notwithstanding,	Kenya	has	a	laudable	legal	and	
institutional	anti-corruption	framework.	Kenya	has	enacted	several	laws	to	assist	in	its	anti-
corruption	efforts.	They	include	the	Constitution	of	Kenya	(2010),	which	established	an	
independent	Ethics	and	Anti-Corruption	Commission	mandated	to	prevent	corruption	and	
economic	crimes	such	as	money	laundering.45	The	country	has	adopted	also	a	specific	anti-
corruption	law,	dubbed	the	Anti-Corruption	and	Economic	Crimes	Act	(2003),	which	provides	
for	economic	crimes.	It	has	ratified	the	United	National	Convention	against	Corruption	(UNCAC)	
and	the	African	Union	Convention	on	Preventing	and	Combating	Corruption	(AU	Convention).	
Kenya	scored	100	(on	a	zero	to	100	scale)	in	the	2011	Global	Integrity	evaluation	of	the	strength	
of	the	country’s	anti-corruption	laws.46	This	is	a	sign	that	the	country	has	adequate	anti-
corruption	laws.	This	study	seeks	to	examine	the	role	of	these	laws	in	curbing	IFFs.	
1.3	 Problem	Statement	
IFFs	have	contributed	to	financial	losses,	undermined	good	governance,	threatened	peace	and	
worsened	income	distribution	in	Kenya.	The	main	hypothesis	of	this	study	is	that	corruption	
plays	an	overarching	role	in	facilitating	IFFs.	Corruption	is	a	source	and	enabler	of	IFFs.	It	
weakens	political,	legal	and	financial	institutional	frameworks,	creating	an	enabling	
environment	for	criminal	and	illicit	business	activities.	Weak	state	institutions,	such	as	banks,	
financial	intelligence	units,	revenue	authorities,	the	police	force	and	the	judicial	system,	hinder	
proper	investigations	into	IFFs	and,	consequently,	impede	implementation	of	anti-IFF	
measures.47	Efforts	to	curb	IFFs,	therefore,	should	start	with	and	focus	on	addressing	corruption	
in	Kenya.	Failure	to	limit	corruption	first	will	make	the	curtailing	of	IFFs	an	almost	impossible	
task.48	This	study	will	analyse	the	extent	to	which	domestic,	regional	and	international	legal	
frameworks	can	strengthen	the	country’s	anti-corruption	efforts	as	the	key	to	curbing	IFFs.	
                                                
45	 The	Constitution	of	Kenya	(Chapter	6:	79).	
46	 Global	Integrity	(2011),	available	at	https://www.globalintegrity.org/research/reports/global-integrity-
report/global-integrity-report-2011/gir-scorecard-2011-kenya/	(visited	11	April	2018).	
47	 Goga	(2015),	available	at	https://issafrica.org/iss-today/how-corruption-drives-illicit-financial-flows	
(visited	8	March	2018).	
48	 Goga	(2015),	available	at	https://issafrica.org/iss-today/how-corruption-drives-illicit-financial-flows	
(visited	8	March	2018).	
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1.4	 Research	Questions	
This	paper	will	seek	to	answer	the	following	questions:	
• What	is	the	link	between	corruption	and	IFFs	in	Kenya?	
• What	opportunities	—and	gaps	—	exist	in	Kenya's	anti-corruption	law	for	curbing	IFFs?	
1.5	 Objectives	of	the	Study	
The	overall	objective	of	this	research	is	to	determine	the	role	of	anti-corruption	laws	in	curbing	
IFFs	in	Kenya.	The	specific	objectives	of	the	paper	are:	
• to	examine	the	correlation	between	corruption	and	IFFs	in	Kenya;	
• to	examine	the	efficiency	of	Kenya’s	anti-corruption	legal	framework	in	curbing	IFFs;	
• to	recommend	measures	which	Kenya	may	take	to	strengthen	its	anti-corruption	laws	and	
to	suggest	how	these	measures	may	be	aligned	to	the	country’s	anti-IFF	mechanisms.	
1.6	 Significance	of	the	Study	
There	is	no	abundance	of	literature	on	the	links	between	corruption	and	IFFs,	especially	from	a	
national	perspective.	IFFs,	despite	having	been	a	problem	in	Africa	for	some	while	already,	only	
gained	prominence	after	the	publication	of	the	HLP	Report.	Even	then,	most	scholars	and	
policy-makers	have	studied	the	issue	from	an	international	and	regional	perspective.	This	study	
shifts	the	focus	to	a	country-specific	context.	Researchers	and	policy-makers	may	use	it	to	
inform	their	studies	of	Kenya	and	as	a	basis	for	comparison	with	other	country	studies.	
The	benefits	of	curbing	IFFs	through	various	anti-corruption	efforts	will	go	beyond	
recovering	financial	losses.	Kenya	will	be	able	not	only	to	finance	its	development	priorities	but	
also	promote	the	rule	of	law	and	good	governance	principles.	
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1.7	 Outline	of	the	Remaining	Chapters	
The	study	contains	three	more	chapters.	
Chapter	Two	analyses	the	link	between	corruption	and	IFFs.	The	first	part	will	explain	
the	concept	of	IFFs	by	analysing	the	different	approaches	to	defining	and	distinguishing	IFFs	
from	other	related	concepts.	The	second	part	discusses	the	relationship	between	IFFs	and	
corruption.	It	looks	specifically	at	how	corruption	is	a	source	and	enabler	of	IFFs.	The	last	
section	discusses	the	impact	of	the	relationship	between	IFFs	and	corruption,	focusing	on	
development,	governance	and	human	rights.	Discussions	in	this	chapter	are	undertaken	
primarily	from	a	Kenyan	perspective.	
The	third	chapter	will	consider	the	role	of	Kenyan	anti-corruption	laws	and	institutions	
in	curbing	IFFs.	This	chapter	will	investigate	what	type	of	IFFs	these	laws	are	aimed	at	stopping,	
that	is,	whether	these	laws	are	concerned	only	with	IFFs	related	to	corruption	or	go	beyond	
that.	It	will	consider	also	how	the	anti-corruption	laws	can	complement	other	Kenyan	laws	
aimed	at	curbing	IFFs.	Most	importantly,	the	chapter	will	interrogate	whether	Kenya	has	an	
effective	institutional	framework	to	implement	its	anti-corruption	laws.	
The	final	chapter	will	include	a	summary	of	the	key	findings	of	the	study	and	detailed	
recommendations	on	a	possible	way	forward	for	Kenya.	It	will	consider	what	needs	to	be	done	
to	ensure	that	the	anti-corruption	laws	are	implemented	with	a	focus	on	curbing	IFFs.	It	will	
consider	also	which	institutions	ought	to	be	responsible	for	the	implementation	of	the	
recommendations.	
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CHAPTER	TWO	
	
CORRUPTION	AND	ILLICIT	FINANCIAL	FLOWS	
	
	
2.1	 Introduction	
Corruption	is	as	old	as	human	civilisation.1	However,	corruption	is	no	longer	a	question	just	of	
ethics	and	integrity.	It	is	an	impediment	to	socio-economic	and	political	development.	It	affects	
the	cost	of	doing	business,	leads	to	the	inefficient	use	of	public	resources,	increases	inequality	
and,	ultimately,	undermines	the	rule	of	law	and	the	legitimacy	of	the	government.	Former	
Secretary-General	of	the	United	Nations	(UN),	the	late	Kofi	Annan,	in	his	statement	on	the	
adoption	of	UNCAC	by	the	General	Assembly,	declared	that:	
Corruption	is	an	insidious	plague	that	has	a	wide	range	of	corrosive	effects	on	
societies.	It	undermines	democracy	and	the	rule	of	law,	leads	to	violations	of	human	
rights,	distorts	markets,	erodes	the	quality	of	life,	and	allows	organised	crime,	
terrorism	and	other	threats	to	human	security	to	flourish.2	
Corruption	has	facilitated	the	increase	of	IFFs,	which	deprive	developing	countries	of	resources	
needed	to	foster	their	socio-economic	development.	
This	chapter	interrogates	the	link	between	corruption	and	IFFs.	The	first	section	aims	at	
demystifying	IFFs.	It	analyses	the	different	approaches	used	to	define	IFFs	and	distinguishes	IFFs	
from	other	related	concepts.	The	next	section	discusses	the	relationship	between	IFFs	and	
corruption.	It	specifically	looks	at	how	corruption	is	a	source	and	enabler	of	IFFs.	The	concluding	
section	discusses	the	impact	of	corruption	and	IFFs,	focusing	on	development,	governance	and	
human	rights.	
2.2	 Understanding	IFFs	
Conceptual	clarity	about	IFFs	informs	academic	discourse	and	enables	refined	research	on	the	
topic.	It	is	an	important	prerequisite	for	developing	laws	and	institutions	that	will	curb	IFFs.3	
                                                
1	 Rothstein	&	Varraich	(2017)	at	31.	
2	 Annan	(2003),	available	at	http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/background/secretary-general-
speech.html	(visited	8	May	2018).	
3	 Reed	&	Fontana	(2011)	at	6.	
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However,	there	is	no	unanimous	definition	of	IFFs.	The	divergences	in	the	definition	of	IFFs	
arise	from	the	diverse	elements	that	cause	these	flows.	
The	concept	of	IFFs	is	an	amalgamation	of	different	legal	concepts.	All	these	concepts	
differ	in	their	relationship	to	IFFs	and	have	varied	explanations	and	understandings	of	the	
source,	transfer	and	use	of	illicit	funds	and	the	approaches	that	should	be	used	to	curb	IFFs.	
These	disparities	lead	to	difficulties	in	reaching	agreement	on	a	definition	of	IFFs.	The	
approaches	used	to	curb	IFFs	involve	also	a	broad	range	of	stakeholders	who	may	favour	one	
definition	of	IFFs	over	another.4	For	instance,	a	tax	justice	advocate	will	insist	on	including	legal	
tax	malpractices,	such	as	tax	avoidance,	in	the	definition,	while	corporate	actors	would	prefer	
to	shield	their	legal	activities	and	hence	they	will	seek	to	limit	the	definition	of	IFFs	to	flows	that	
contravene	the	law.5	
2.2.1	 Approaches	to	Defining	IFFs	
There	is	no	generally	accepted	legal	definition	of	IFFs.	However,	international	institutions	and	
academics	have	their	own	non-legal	definition.	Miyandazi	&	Ronceray	identify	four	approaches	
used	to	define	IFFs,	namely,	the	legalistic,	the	normative,	the	developmental	and	the	“no	
definition”	approaches.6	
The	legalistic	approach	is	a	narrow	interpretation	of	IFFs	which	focuses	on	proceeds	and	
activities	that	have	contravened	the	law.	Most	international	development	organisations,	such	
as	the	World	Bank,	the	Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development	(OECD)	and	
Global	Financial	Integrity	(GFI),	adopt	the	legalistic	approach.	The	World	Bank	refers	to	IFFs	as	
the	cross-border	movement	of	capital	associated	with	illegal	activity	or,	more	explicitly,	money	
that	is	earned,	transferred	or	used	illegally	and	that	crosses	borders.7	The	OECD	defines	IFFs	as	
flows	that	are	generated	by	methods,	practices	and	crimes	aimed	at	transferring	financial	
                                                
4	 Miyandazi	&	Ronceray	(2018)	at	3.	
5	 Miyandazi	&	Ronceray	(2018)	at	3.	
6	 Miyandazi	&	Ronceray	(2018)	at	6.	
7	 World	Bank	(2017),	available	at	http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialsector/brief/illicit-financial-
flows-iffs	(visited	9	March	2018).	
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capital	out	of	a	country	in	contravention	of	national	or	international	laws.8	GFI	defines	IFFs	as	
the	illegal	movement	of	money	that	has	been	earned,	transferred	and/or	used	illegally.9	
These	definitions	exclude	activities,	such	as	aggressive	tax	avoidance,	that	do	not	
infringe	any	law.	Instead,	they	focus	on	money	and	activities	that	have	a	clear	link	to	illegality.	
The	illegality	may	arise	from	one	or	more	of	the	following	scenarios:	
• The	funds	are	proceeds	of	illegal	activities	such	as	human	trafficking,	tax	evasion	or	
embezzlement	of	public	money.10	
• There	is	an	illegal	transfer	of	funds	which	could	occur	if	an	individual	evades	custom	
controls	and	other	regulatory	controls.11	It	could	occur	also	if	an	individual	violates	legal	
obligations	relating	to	the	funds,	for	instance,	contravening	tax	laws	by	deliberately	
falsifying	tax	returns	and	books	of	account.12	It	does	not	matter	whether	the	money	being	
transferred	is	derived	from	legal	activities,	as	long	as	the	process	of	transferring	the	money	
has	contravened	the	law.	
• The	money	is	used	for	an	illegal	purpose,	for	instance,	financing	drug	trafficking.13	Criminals	
often	transfer	money	illegally	to	avoid	any	complications	with	the	law.	
By	contrast,	the	normative	approach	adopts	a	broader	interpretation	of	IFFs.	Forstater	
notes	that:	
[A]	normative	definition	of	IFFs	is	not	limited	to	financial	or	capital	flows	with	a	
connection	to	illegality,	but	includes	activities	which	are	deemed	to	be	undesirable,	
immoral,	or	“unacceptable	to	the	public”,	in	particular	focused	on	tax	avoidance.14	
The	HLP	defines	IFFs	as	the	illegal	movement	of	money	that	has	been	earned,	transferred	
and/or	used	illegally.15	This	definition	is	similar	to	the	GFI	definition.	However,	the	HLP	further	
explains	that	it	considers	the	term	“illicit”	to	include	activities	which	may	not	be	strictly	illegal	
                                                
8	 OECD	(2014)	at	16.	
9	 GFI	(2018),	available	at	http://www.gfintegrity.org/issue/illicit-financial-flows/	(visited	8	March	2018).	
10	 Reed	&	Fontana	(2011)	at	6.	
11	 Reed	&	Fontana	(2011)	at	6.	
12	 UNECA	(2018)	at	2.	
13	 UNECA	(2018)	at	2.	
14	 Forstater	(2018)	at	5.	
15	 HLP	(2015)	at	23.	
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but	nonetheless	go	against	established	rules	and	norms.16	Thus,	the	HLP	definition	includes	acts	
such	as	aggressive	tax	avoidance	in	its	understanding	of	the	causes	of	IFFs.17	We	can	infer,	
therefore,	that	the	HLP	has	adopted	a	broader	definition	of	IFFs.	The	UN	has	not	provided	an	
official	definition	of	IFFs.	However,	recent	publications	of	UN	organs	show	that	the	UN	is	
endorsing	the	normative	approach.	The	2018	United	Nations	Economic	Commission	for	Africa	
(UNECA)	study	on	the	global	governance	architecture	of	IFFs	notes	that	the	word	“illicit”	refers	
not	only	to	illegal	acts	but	also	to	acts	that	are	improper	and	not	sanctioned	by	a	law	or	
custom.18	The	African	Union	(AU),	too,	does	not	have	a	formal	definition	of	IFFs.	However,	the	
Assembly	of	Heads	of	State	and	Government	of	the	AU	formally	endorsed	the	HLP	report,19	
implying	that	the	AU	has	embraced	the	HLP	definition	of	IFFs.	
The	key	point	of	contention	between	the	legalistic	and	normative	approaches	concerns	
the	definition	of	“illicit”	and	“illegal”.	The	legalistic	approach	considers	only	practices	that	have	
contravened	the	law.	The	normative	approach	does	not	limit	its	definition	to	illegality	but	also	
considers	practices	that	are	morally	unacceptable.	This	divergence	links	to	the	debate	on	
whether	commercial	activities	—	such	as	aggressive	tax	avoidance	and	corruptly	negotiated	
contracts	—	are	to	be	regarded	as	sources	of	IFFs.	
The	number	of	academics	and	institutions	adopting	the	broader	approach	to	defining	
IFFs	is	growing.	There	are	several	justifications	for	doing	so.	The	first	justification	comes	from	
the	etymology	of	the	word	“illicit”.20	The	Merriam-Webster	Dictionary	defines	illicit	as	
“something	that	is	unlawful	or	illegal;	involving	activities	that	are	morally	unacceptable”.21	
Similarly,	the	Oxford	Dictionary	defines	“illicit”	acts	as	“acts	not	authorised	or	allowed;	
improper,	irregular;	[especially]	not	sanctioned	by	law,	rule,	or	custom;	unlawful,	forbidden”.22	
The	term	“illicit”	has	a	dual	usage	that	is	not	limited	linguistically	to	illegality.	The	second	
                                                
16	 HLP	(2015)	at	23.	
17	 HLP	(2015)	at	24.	
18	 UNECA	(2018)	at	2.	
19	 Assembly	of	Heads	of	State	and	Government	of	the	African	Union	Special	Declaration	on	Illicit	Financial	
Flows	at	Doc.Assembly/AU/17(XXIV).	
20	 Forstater	(2018)	at	6.	
21	 Merriam-Webster	(2018),	available	at	https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/illicit	(visited	18	
August	2018).	
22	 Oxford	English	Dictionary	(2018),	available	at	http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/91445	(visited	18	August	
2018).	
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meaning	of	the	term	includes	practices	and	activities	that	society	or	custom	condemns	or	
considers	morally	unacceptable.	Therefore,	from	an	etymological	perspective,	IFFs	ought	to	
address	practices	that	go	beyond	what	is	strictly	illegal.	
In	addition,	equating	illicitness	to	illegality	means	that	illicit	practices	cannot	be	
construed	as	illegal	unless	a	court	of	law	or	a	competent	authority	deems	them	illegal.23	There	
is	a	presumption	of	innocence	in	most	legal	systems	and	illegality	can	be	proved	only	after	the	
completion	of	a	formal	process.24	Regrettably,	relying	solely	upon	formal	proof	of	guilt	entails	
underestimating	the	volume	of	IFFs,	in	that	the	count	would	be	limited	to	the	values	attached	
to	activities	that	a	court	of	law	has	considered	illegal.25	Therefore,	adopting	the	broader	
definition	of	IFFs	would	help	countries	obtain	a	clearer	picture	of	the	financial	losses	resulting	
from	the	weakness	in	their	legal	systems.26	Forstater	observes	that:	
Considering	illicit	practices	as	sources	of	IFFs	will	enhance	the	enforcement	capacity	
of	revenue	authorities	to	trace	and	stop	these	flows.27	
It	also	places	a	moral	obligation	on	governments	to	amend	laws	that	facilitate	tax	revenue	
losses.28	
The	developmental	approach	agrees	with	the	normative	approach,	but	excludes	flows	
that	have	no	adverse	impact	on	sustainable	development.29	Proponents	of	this	theory	argue	
that	some	IFFs,	such	as	those	linked	to	corruption,	may	contribute	to	political	stability	through	
a	clientelist	distribution	of	resources.	They	base	their	reasoning	on	the	acceptance	of	some	
forms	of	IFFs	(corruption-related	IFFs	in	particular)	as	a	fact	of	life	or	a	lesser	evil	than	the	
instability	caused	by	them.30	An	inherent	shortcoming	of	this	approach	is	that	failure	to	crack	
down	upon	IFFs	will	encourage	perpetrators	to	continue	with	the	illicit	acts,	which	ultimately	
will	foster	instability.31	Another	shortcoming	of	the	developmental	approach	is	that	it	fails	to	
                                                
23	 Chowla	&	Falcao	(2016)	at	15.		
24	 Chowla	&	Falcao	(2016)	at	15.	
25	 Chowla	&	Falcao	(2016)	at	15.	
26	 Chowla	&	Falcao	(2016)	at	15.	
27	 Forstater	(2018)	at	7.	
28	 UNECA	(2018)	at	3.	
29	 Blankenburg	&	Khan	(2012)	at	25.	
30	 Miyandazi	&	Ronceray	(2018)	at	9.	
31	 Miyandazi	&	Ronceray	(2018)	at	9.	
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consider	the	impact	of	IFFs	on	human	rights.32	Thus	far,	no	researcher	has	estimated	the	value	
of	IFFs	in	terms	of	this	definition.33	
The	“no	definition”	approach	avoids	the	semantic	discussion	embedded	in	the	other	
approaches	and	tackles	the	different	IFFs	individually.34	The	European	Commission	has	adopted	
this	approach.	Its	main	shortcoming	is	that	it	excludes	the	possibility	of	an	integrated	policy	
approach	and	ignores	the	striking	statistics	of	large	volumes	of	“dirty	money”.35	
This	research	paper	adopts	the	broader	definition	of	IFFs	which	acknowledges	that	
illicitness	is	not	synonymous	with	illegality.	It	also	endorses	definitions	that	consider	the	
adverse	effects	of	IFFs	on	a	broader	spectrum	of	global	issues,	including	development,	
governance	and	human	rights.	
2.2.2	 Distinguishing	IFFs	from	Related	Concepts	
In	order	to	understand	the	concept	of	IFFs	better,	it	is	important	to	distinguish	it	from	certain	
related	concepts.	
• IFFs	and	Illicit	Finance	
Illicit	finance	refers	to	national	and	cross-border	financing	of	illicit	activities	and	includes	
domestic	tax	evasion	and	corrupt	activities.36	The	concept	of	IFFs	emanates	from	the	wider	
concept	of	illicit	financing	but	focuses	only	on	cross-border	financing.37	Chowla	&	Falcao	note	
that	“the	negative	impact	of	illicit	finance	on	a	country’s	domestic	resource	mobilisation	ability	
is	as	detrimental	as	that	of	IFFs”.38	The	definition	of	IFFs	sometimes	includes	money	that	
remains	within	national	borders	and	is	hidden	from	enforcement	agencies	or	laundered	
domestically.39	This	paper	considers	only	IFFs	that	cross	international	borders.	
	
                                                
32	 Miyandazi	&	Ronceray	(2018)	at	9.	
33	 Miyandazi	&	Ronceray	(2018)	at	9.	
34	 Miyandazi	&	Ronceray	(2018)	at	9.	
35	 Miyandazi	&	Ronceray	(2018)	at	9.	
36	 Chowla	&	Falcao	(2016)	at	2.	
37	 Chowla	&	Falcao	(2016)	at	2.	
38	 Chowla	&	Falcao	(2016)	at	2.	
39	 Ritter	(2015)	at	10.	
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• IFFs	and	Capital	Flight	
Researchers	sometimes	use	capital	flight	and	IFFs	synonymously.	It	has	been	observed	that:	
Capital	flight	means	capital	flows	that	are	not	recorded	in	the	official	records	of	the	
transactions	between	a	country	and	the	rest	of	the	world.40	
The	main	record	of	such	transactions	is	the	Balance	of	Payments,	which	records	the	difference	
between	the	capital	inflows	and	the	capital	outflows	of	a	country.41	Foreign	direct	investments	
are	a	major	source	of	capital	inflows	in	Africa.42	The	purpose	of	capital	flight	is	to	move	capital	
from	developing	countries	to	safer	havens	and	secure	better	returns.43	Capital	flight	may	be	
legal	or	illegal	depending	on	the	source	of	the	capital	and	the	method	used	to	transfer	the	
money.	According	to	Reed	&	Fontana:	“Illegal	capital	flight	is	often	unrecorded	and	is	typically	
proceeds	of	illegal	activities,	namely,	illicit	flows.”44	IFFs	cover	a	broader	set	of	transactions	
than	capital	flight,	including	criminal	proceeds	and	illicit	commercial	activities.45	
• IFFs	and	Money	Laundering	
Money	laundering	is	a	source	of	IFFs.	The	Financial	Action	Task	Force	(FATF)	defines	money	
laundering	as	the	process	of	disguising	the	origin	of	proceeds	of	illegal	activities	to	make	them	
appear	legal.46	Money	laundering	is	a	well-founded	legal	concept	supported	by	several	
international	and	national	legal	instruments.	Merging	money	laundering	and	IFFs	may	lead	to	
an	over-reliance	on	anti-money	laundering	measures,	thereby	restricting	the	use	of	anti-IFF	
measures.47	Anti-money	laundering	measures	are	limited	to	proceeds	of	illegal	activities	
originating	from	a	specific	set	of	predicate	criminal	offences	which	vary	across	countries.	
Depending	on	the	jurisdiction,	these	offences	may	exclude	crimes	such	as	corruption	and	tax	
evasion	which	are	significant	sources	of	IFFs.	
	 	
                                                
40	 Ajayi	&	Ndikumana	(2015)	at	3.	
41	 Ajayi	&	Ndikumana	(2015)	at	3.	
42	 Ajayi	&	Ndikumana	(2015)	at	3.	
43	 Kant	(2002)	at	345.	
44	 Reed	&	Fontana	(2011)	at	7.	
45	 Ajayi	&	Ndikumana	(2015)	at	4.	
46	 FATF	(2018),	available	at	http://www.fatf-gafi.org/faq/moneylaundering/	(visited	18	August	2018).	
47	 Reed	&	Fontana	(2011)	at	8.	
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• IFFs	and	Informal	Flows	
Informal	flows	are	referred	to	also	as	the	hawala	money	transfer	system.	The	hawala	system	
involves	the	transfer	and	receipt	of	funds	or	equivalent	value	settled	through	trade,	cash	and	
net	settlement	over	a	long	period.48	It	often	is	limited	to	specific	geographic	regions	or	ethnic	
communities.49	
Like	capital	flight,	informal	flows	may	be	illicit	or	licit.	Some	countries	consider	informal	
flows	to	be	legal.	They	support	the	use	of	the	informal	systems	because	of	the	difficulties	of	
transmitting	money,	the	lack	of	access	to	banking,	the	culture	of	the	community,	and	the	
location	of	the	country	of	source	or	destination.50	Other	countries	consider	such	flows	as	illegal	
and	refer	to	them	only	within	the	context	of	underground	or	criminal	money	transfer	services.51	
Sometimes,	these	systems	may	be	used	also	for	an	illicit	purpose,	such	as	tax	evasion	or	
evading	currency	controls.	
2.3	 Link	between	Corruption	and	IFFs	
Corruption	and	IFFs	are	both	complex	global	phenomena	with	no	precise	definition.	Still,	
academics	and	global	institutions	readily	blame	global	underdevelopment	on	these	two	
phenomena.	The	question,	then,	is	what	is	the	link	between	them?	According	to	Ayogu	&	
Gbadebo-Smith,	“grand	corruption	lies	at	the	core	of	the	problem	of	IFFs	from	African	
countries”.52	Corruption	is	a	source	of	IFFs,	it	facilitates	opportunistic	crimes	that	lead	to	IFFs,	it	
reinforces	incidents	of	IFFs	and	corrodes	the	good	governance	structures	useful	in	curtailing	
IFFs.	This	section	details	aspects	of	this	relationship.	
2.3.1 Corruption	as	a	Source	of	Criminal	Proceeds	
The	embezzled	proceeds	of	state	funds,	grand	corruption	and	bribes	constitute	some	of	the	
illicit	funds	that	criminals	transfer	illegally	out	of	a	country.	The	Panama	Papers	reveal	how	
                                                
48	 FATF	Report	(2013)	at	12.	
49	 FATF	Report	(2013)	at	12.	
50	 FATF	Report	(2013)	at	13	
51	 FATF	Report	(2013)	at	12.	
52	 Ayogu	&	Gbadebo-Smith	(2015)	at	278.	
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African	elites	hide	proceeds	of	corruption	from	authorities.53	Criminals	often	launder	these	
illicit	proceeds	to	bank	accounts	in	foreign	jurisdictions	with	high	levels	of	banking	secrecy.	
They	then	use	the	money	for	illegal	or	legal	purposes	in	the	country	of	origin	or	elsewhere.	
The	HLP	estimation	of	corruption-related	IFFs	has	been	a	topic	of	debate.	Some	argue	
that	the	volumes	of	these	IFFs	is	far	higher	than	the	projected	five	per	cent.	In	fact,	the	
responses	to	the	Panel’s	questionnaires	on	the	issue	showed	that	most	people	felt	that	
corruption	was	the	main	cause	of	IFFs	in	their	countries.54	The	pervasiveness	of	corruption	
makes	it	difficult	to	estimate	the	volume	of	IFFs	caused	by	it.	For	instance:	
petty	bribery	—	a	phenomenon	which	plagues	the	lives	of	millions	in	many	
countries	—	is	much	less	likely	to	yield	detectable	IFFs	unless	one	official	receives	
large	numbers	of	small	bribes	that	then	need	to	be	laundered.55	
However,	grand	corruption	yields	detectable	IFFs.	For	instance,	the	2004	Kroll	Report	into	the	
high	level	of	corruption	in	the	Kenyan	government	alleged	that	former	President	Daniel	Arap	
Moi,	together	with	his	relatives	and	close	associates,	siphoned	off	more	than	£1	billion	of	state	
resources	into	foreign	banks	and	acquisitions.56	If	true,	this	would	place	Moi	on	a	par	with	other	
African	kleptocrats,	such	as	former	President	Mobuto	Sese	Seko	of	Zaire	and	former	President	
General	Sani	Abacha	of	Nigeria.57	
2.3.2 Corruption	as	an	Enabler	of	Abusive	Commercial	Practices	
The	potential	for	evading	tax	and	hiding	illicit	funds	securely	in	tax	havens	is	a	major	incentive	
for	abusive	commercial	activities	such	as	transfer	mispricing	and	trade	misinvoicing.	Corruption	
lowers	the	chances	of	detection	and	consequently	increases	the	prospective	returns.	
Corruption	is	evident	in	authorities	that	are	tasked	with	the	collection	of	tax	revenue.	Often,	
such	tax	authorities	are	“weak	and	characterised	by	extensive	evasion,	corruption	and	
                                                
53	 International	Consortium	of	Investigative	Journalists	(ICIJ)	(2017),	available	at	
https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/	(visited	20	August	2018).	
54	 HLP	(2015)	at	32.	
55	 Reed	&	Fontana	(2011)	at	20.	
56	 Rice	(2007),	available	at	https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/31/kenya.topstories3	(visited	12	
September	2018).	
57	 Rice	(2007),	available	at	https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/31/kenya.topstories3	(visited	12	
September	2018).	
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coercion”.58	Corrupt	businesses	can	bribe	a	tax	official	to	make	a	“favourable”	interpretation	of	
tax	regulations	that	lowers	their	tax	liability	or	to	ignore	an	obvious	incident	of	tax	evasion.59	
Corrupt	acts	in	tax	agencies	also	may	involve:	
charging	for	free	services,	diverting	cash,	making	false	repayment	claims;	losing	
files;	and	receiving	payments	to	complete	tax	returns	or	bribes	to	favourably	settle	
audits.60	
Kenya	Revenue	Authority	officials	are	amongst	the	top	bribe-taking	officials	in	Kenya.61	The	
International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF)	notes	that:	
corruption	affects	taxation	by	weakening	the	state’s	capacity	to	tax,	leading	to	lower	
revenue	collections;	creating	disincentives	for	taxpayers	to	pay	taxes;	reducing	the	
impetus	for	the	state	to	collect	taxes;	and	undermining	spending	programmes.62	
However,	corruption	is	prevalent	not	just	amongst	tax	authorities.	One	can	find	it	too	amongst	
intermediaries	(also	referred	to	as	enablers,	gatekeepers	or	facilitators)	of	the	global	financial	
system.	Intermediaries	are	a:	
heterogeneous	network	of	professionals	that	flout	and	use	loopholes	in	both	
national	and	international	laws	to	generate	and	drive	the	cross-border	outflow	of	
illicit	finance.63	
They	are	key	vectors	of	corrupt	practices.	Corrupt	lawyers,	for	instance,	may	assist	MNCs	to	
evade	tax	and	launder	the	criminal	proceeds.	
2.3.3 Corruption	as	an	Enabler	of	Transnational	Criminal	Activities	
Corruption	is	an	integral	part	of	transnational	organised	crime.	It	gives	rise	to	international	
criminal	networks	that	rely	on	bought	protection,	information	and	influence	to	run	their	
criminal	activities.	Bribery	remains	the	most	common	form	of	corruption	relating	to	
                                                
58	 Brautigam	(2008)	at	1.	
59	 Reed	&	Fontana	(2011)	at	19.	
60	 Tjen	&	Evans	(2017)	at	246.	
61	 Business	Today	(11	December	2015),	available	at	https://businesstoday.co.ke/kra-and-judiciary-staff-top-
bribe-taking-list/		(visited	8	September	2018).		
62	 IMF	(2016),	available	at	
https://www.imf.org/external/error.htm?URL=http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Staff-Discussion-
%20%20Notes/Issues/2016/12/31/Corruption-Costs-and-Mitigating-Strategies-43888	(visited	8	
September	2018).	
63	 Rai	(2017)	at	4.	
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transnational	crimes.64	Criminal	networks	rely	on	bribes	to	run	their	criminal	activities	and	
engage	in	illicit	business	without	interruption	from	law	enforcement.	Police	officers	accept	
bribes	to	intimidate	legitimate	business	owners	competing	with	the	criminals.	Labour	or	
immigration	officials	willingly	accept	money	to	feign	ignorance	and	allow	human	trafficking	and	
smuggling.	Criminals	bribe	judges	to	protect	them	from	prosecution.	They	may	bribe	private	
citizens	also.	For	instance,	the	owner	of	a	transport	business	may	receive	a	bribe	to	transport	
trafficked	persons	or	goods	without	reporting	it	to	the	authorities.	
Criminal	gangs	also	use	extortion	and	protection	rackets	to	intimidate	legitimate	
business	owners.	Protection	rackets	involve:	
circumstances	where	a	victim	pays	money	under	duress	in	exchange	for	avoiding	
damage	to	a	business,	construction	site,	or	harm	to	employees	and	customers.65	
Corruption	is	one	of	the	underlying	conditions	for	the	existence	of	protection	rackets,	since	
control	by	law	enforcement	authorities	is	inefficient.	
In	some	extreme	situations,	corruption	may	entail	state	capture.	This	is	a	form	of	grand	
corruption	which	has	been	defined	as:	
the	corrupt	efforts	of	firms	to	shape	the	laws,	policies,	and	regulations	of	the	state	
to	their	own	advantage	by	providing	illicit	private	gains	to	public	officials.66	
However,	state	capture	need	not	involve	firms	and	can	involve	individuals	or	criminal	networks	
instead.	An	example	is	the	Gupta	family	control	over	South	African	politicians	and	government-
owned	companies.67	Criminals	can	engage	in	corrupt	acts,	such	as	bribing	of	parliamentarians	
to	vote	on	laws	that	favour	them,	bribing	of	government	officials	to	enact	favourable	
regulations	and	bribing	of	judges	to	influence	court	decisions.68	These	acts	aim	at	creating	a	
favourable	environment	for	their	criminal	activities,	to	the	detriment	of	the	general	welfare.	
                                                
64	 Article	8	of	UNCTOC.		
65	 E4J	University	Module	Series:	Organized	Crime	(2018),	available	at	
https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/organized-crime/module-4/key-issues/extortion-racketeering.html	(visited	
20	August	2018).	
66	 Hellman	&	Kaufmann	(2001),	available	at	
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/09/hellman.htm	(visited	20	August	2018).	
67	 GUPTA-leaks.com	(2018),	available	at		http://www.gupta-leaks.com/	(visited	20	August	2018).	
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Money	is	the	driving	force	behind	organised	crime.	The	globalisation	of	financial	
systems	has	caused	an	increase	in	international	corruption	and	money	laundering.	Corruption	
and	money	laundering	have	a	symbiotic	relationship.69	Corruption	contributes	not	only	to	
enormous	profits	that	are	laundered	but	also	is	a	catalyst	for	money	laundering.70	Corruption	
can	render	anti-money	laundering	systems	dysfunctional	by	preventing	the	adoption	of	
effective	anti-money	laundering	measures	and	overwhelming	the	system	with	a	large	volume	of	
cases.71	
Corruption	is	a	key	catalyst	for	transnational	crimes	in	Kenya.	The	2017	US	State	
Department	Trafficking	in	Persons	Report	records	that	corruption	is	rampant	at	all	levels	of	the	
Kenyan	government.	This	has	enabled	traffickers	easily	to	obtain	fraudulent	identity	documents	
from	complicit	government	officials.72	The	Report	states	it	is	unclear	how	many	corrupt	law	
enforcement	officials	have	been	prosecuted	or	convicted	for	being	complicit	in	human	
trafficking.73	The	reason	for	this	lack	of	statistics	may	lie	in	a	lack	of	proper	record	keeping.	
However,	it	is	plausible	also	that	the	corrupt	government	officials	bribed	themselves	out	of	
being	prosecuted	or	convicted.	
Corruption	has	fuelled	trafficking	in	wildlife	products	in	Kenya.	Dr	Richard	Leakey,	
chairman	of	the	Kenya	Wildlife	Service	(KWS),	has	said:	
The	corruption	isn’t	just	in	wildlife	management,	but	at	the	ports,	at	law	
enforcement	agencies,	it’s	with	the	customs,	parts	of	the	judiciary,	it’s	certainly	
present	at	many	levels	in	the	police	force,	it’s	certainly	very	real	and	still	is	to	a	
certain	extent	in	the	KWS.	Government	administration	is	in	places,	particularly	in	
the	countryside,	compromised.74	
Corrupt	politicians	and	criminal	syndicates	run	organised	cartels	in	Kenya.	Although	there	is	
insufficient	evidence	to	point	to	the	extent	of	the	power	of	these	cartels,	it	is	possible	that	they	
                                                
69	 Chaikin	&	Sharman	(2009)	at	1.	
70	 Goredema	(2011)	at	4.	
71	 Eastern	and	Southern	Africa	Anti-Money	Laundering	Group	(ESAAMLG)	(2009),	available	at	
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have	substantial	influence	in	parliamentary	processes.75	Former	Chief	Justice	of	Kenya,	Willy	
Mutunga,	admitted	that	the	legal	system	was	ill-equipped	to	deal	with	the	overwhelming	
influence	of	the	criminal	syndicates,	stating	that	the	criminals	would	be	brought	into	“a	corrupt	
investigating	system,	through	a	corrupt	anti-corruption	system,	and	a	corrupt	judiciary”.76	
All	these	forms	of	corruption	weaken	the	efficiency	of	law	enforcement	agencies	and	
the	judiciary.	The	influence	and	power	of	criminal	gangs	may	overwhelm	police	in	countries	
with	weak	law	enforcement	agencies.	This	reduces	the	chances	of	criminals	being	caught	and	
encourages	more	corruption.	
2.3.4 Corruption	as	an	Impediment	to	Good	Governance	and	Anti-IFF	Measures	
Good	governance	refers	to	political	and	institutional	processes	aimed	at	achieving	development	
goals.	These	processes	embrace	respect	for	the	rule	of	law,	transparency	and	accountability,	
and	efficiency	and	effectiveness	of	the	public	sector.77	“Grand	corruption	is	at	the	core	of	the	
nexus	of	governance	and	IFFs.”78	According	to	Ayogu	&	Gbadebo-Smith,	corruption	and	
governance	are	embroiled	in	two	incompatible	cycles,	the	virtuous	cycle	and	the	vicious	cycle.	
In	the	former,	good	governance	curbs	corruption.	In	the	latter,	corruption	corrodes	governance	
because	poor	governance	enables	corruption.79	It	is	the	vicious	cycle	that	links	corruption,	
governance	and	IFFs.	
The	presence	of	IFFs	in	an	economy	indicates	poor	governance.	Poor	governance	
enables	corruption	and	opportunistic	crimes	which	are	sources	of	IFFs.	Corruption	is	a	
profitable	business.	Business	people	find	it	easier	to	make	money	through	illicit	activities	than	
through	legitimate	business.80	Curbing	corruption,	therefore,	means	interfering	with	a	lucrative	
source	of	income	for	corrupt	elites.	Corrupt	leaders	have	no	political	will	to	stop	corruption	or	
the	IFFs	caused	and	facilitated	by	it.	They,	therefore,	hinder	the	enforcement	of	the	rule	of	law	
and	frustrate	anti-IFF	measures.	
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2.4	 Effects	of	Corruption	and	IFFs	
IFFs	have	received	considerable	global	attention	because	of	their	adverse	impact	on	
development	objectives.	IFFs	hinder	the	achievement	of	the	UN’s	Sustainable	Development	
Goals	(SDGs).	They	impede	the	domestic	resource	mobilisation	efforts	of	developing	countries,	
which	reduces	the	financial	resources	available	for	socio-economic	development.	This	obstructs	
the	efforts	of	the	global	community	to	achieve	SDG	Target	17,	which	calls	for	domestic	resource	
mobilisation.81	The	transfer	of	funds	from	developing	countries	to	developed	countries	also	
aggravates	inequalities	between	countries,	impeding	the	achievement	of	SDG	Target	10,	which	
seeks	to	reduce	inequalities	within	and	among	countries.82	
“The	costs	of	IFFs	are	not	just	the	plundered	monies	lost	to	foreign	jurisdictions,	but	also	
include	negative	impacts	on	governance.”83	Poor	governance	increases	the	incidence	of	
corruption.	The	discussions	in	this	chapter	have	established	that	countries	cannot	reduce	IFFs	
unless	they	also	confront	corruption.	Thus,	the	SDGs,	IFFs	and	corruption	are	inextricably	
linked.	We	cannot	endeavour	to	achieve	the	SDGs	without	addressing	IFFs	and	the	corruption	
that	facilitates	these	flows.	African	countries	must	resolve	to	work	together	significantly	to	
promote	good	governance,	transparency	and	accountability	on	the	continent	and	to	curtail	
IFFs.	
Rampant	corruption	and	powerful	transnational	criminal	gangs	in	Kenya	are	eroding	
state	institutions	and	public	confidence	in	them.	Owners	of	legitimate	businesses	are	
apprehensive	about	investing	in	a	country	that	is	ridden	with	corrupt	governments	and	criminal	
gangs.	
As	a	result,	development	is	being	hampered,	governance	undermined,	public	trust	
in	institutions	destroyed,	and	international	confidence	in	Kenya’s	future	is	
constantly	tested.84	
                                                
81	 SDG	(2015),	available	at	https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/	
(visited	20	September	2018).	
82	 Muchhala	(2018),	available	at	
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/Session19/A_HRC_WG.2_19_CRP_3.docx	(visited	
20	September	2018).	
83	 Ayogu	&	Gbadebo-Smith	(2015)	at	289.	
84	 Gastrow	(2011)	at	2.	
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GFI	estimates	that	in	the	period	2002-2006,	Kenya	lost	approximately	Ksh68.8	billion	to	IFFs.85	
Presumably,	the	GFI	estimates	have	increased	significantly	in	the	past	decade	and	the	country	is	
losing	even	more	money	to	IFFs.	The	billions	of	shillings	lost	to	IFFs	could	have	helped	to	
achieve	the	development	agenda	of	the	country.	To	put	it	into	perspective,	in	the	2018-2019	
budget,	Kenya	plans	to	spend	Ksh44.6	billion	on	the	health	sector,	Ksh20.25	billion	on	food	
security	and	Ksh6.5	billion	on	affordable	housing.	86	This	means	the	lost	Ksh68.8	billion	could	
have	helped	Kenya	better	equip	its	hospitals,	feed	its	citizens	and	partly	fund	decent	housing	
for	all.	
IFFs	and	corruption	are	not	only	a	development	and	governance	concern	but	are	also	a	
human	rights	issue.	IFFs	deprive	countries	of	development	resources	needed	to	implement	
their	human	rights	obligations	and	to	establish	and	strengthen	institutions	that	uphold	human	
rights.87	“The	right	to	development	makes	the	prevention	and	regulation	of	IFFs	a	human	rights	
imperative.”88	IFFs	also	undermine	the	rule	of	law.	The	existence	of	illicit	funds	in	the	economy	
encourages	transnational	criminal	activities	in	the	private	and	public	sectors.	The	lucrativeness	
of	IFFs	lowers	the	incentive	for	corrupt	political	leaders	to	strengthen	revenue	authorities,	law	
enforcement	agencies,	the	judiciary	and	public	financial	management.	
2.5	 Conclusion	
Proper	definition	is	key	to	understanding	IFFs,	their	effects	on	development	and,	ultimately,	the	
most	appropriate	measures	for	curbing	them.	Despite	the	lack	of	an	agreed	definition,	IFFs	are	
emerging	as	an	important	and	valuable	concept	that	brings	together	previously	disconnected	
issues.	Now,	countries	need	to	focus	on	developing	effective	anti-IFF	measures.	However,	in	
order	adequately	to	address	the	impediments	of	IFFs,	countries	need	to	appreciate	the	unique	
correlation	between	these	flows	and	corruption.	The	discussion	in	this	chapter	has	shown	that	
corruption	plays	an	integral	role	in	the	proliferation	and	persistence	of	IFFs	from	Kenya.	
                                                
85	 Kar	&	Cartwright-Smith	(2008)	at	67.	
86	 The	National	Treasury	(2018),	available	at	http://www.treasury.go.ke/budget-statement-2018-19.html	
(visited	20	September	2018).	
87	 International	Bar	Association	(2013)	at	2.	
88	 Muchhala	(2018),	available	at	
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/Session19/A_HRC_WG.2_19_CRP_3.docx	(visited	
20	September	2018).	
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Corruption	is	not	only	a	source	of	the	illegal	proceeds	that	are	transferred	across	international	
borders	but	also	an	enabler	of	the	other	illicit	activities	that	cause	IFFs.	What	is	more,	it	
hampers	good	governance	mechanisms	that	play	a	vital	role	in	ensuring	the	efficiency	and	
effectiveness	of	anti-IFF	measures.	
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CHAPTER	THREE	
	
USING	ANTI-CORRUPTION	LAWS	AND	INSTITUTIONS	AGAINST	ILLICIT	FINANCIAL	FLOWS		
	
	
3.1	 Introduction	
Chapter	Two	discussed	the	relationship	between	corruption	and	IFFs.	This	chapter	broadens	
that	discussion	and	considers	how	anti-corruption	laws	and	institutions	may	be	used	to	counter	
IFFs.	The	first	section	of	this	chapter	contains	a	discussion	of	the	different	roles	which	anti-
corruption	laws	and	institutions	can	play	in	curbing	IFFs.	The	role	of	these	laws	and	institutions	
is	not	limited	to	imposing	criminal	sanctions	against	corrupt	individuals	but	also	encompasses	
preventive	measures	which	promote	transparency,	accountability	and	good	governance.	The	
first	section	also	considers	how	anti-corruption	laws	can	curb	the	abusive	commercial	practices	
and	criminal	activities	that	cause	IFFs.	The	next	two	sections	of	the	chapter	discuss	specific	anti-
corruption	laws	(and	institutions)	which,	if	effectively	implemented,	will	reduce	considerably	
the	prevalence	of	IFFs	in	Kenya.	These	laws	include	both	national	and	international	laws	that	
Kenya	has	adopted.	
3.2	 Anti-Corruption	Laws	and	Institutions	as	Key	Anti-IFF	Tools	
“Corruption	is	a	cross-cutting	and	integral	part	of	IFFs	because	of	its	facilitating	role.”1	Global,	
regional	and	national	anti-corruption	efforts	therefore	can	play	a	significant	role	in	reducing	
IFFs.	Anti-corruption	laws	and	institutions	legitimise	anti-corruption	efforts.	They	provide	a	
framework	for	good	governance,	which	is	an	important	prerequisite	for	reducing	IFFs.	Good	
governance	encourages	administrative	and	financial	accountability	in	the	private	and	public	
sectors,	enhances	transparency	in	taxation	and	custom	systems,	creates	a	secure	environment	
for	filing	complaints	against	corrupt	individuals,	and	promotes	a	fair	and	just	judiciary.	
The	question,	however,	is	precisely	how	anti-corruption	laws	and	bodies	provide	a	legal	
basis	for	tackling	IFFs?	There	is	no	international	or	national	law	on	IFFs.	Instead,	governments	
rely	on	laws	which	seek	to	prevent	the	specific	sources	of	IFFs.	These	include	anti-corruption	
laws,	tax	laws	and	laws	against	transnational	crimes.	This	paper	focuses	on	anti-corruption	
                                                
1	 HLP	(2015)	at	69.	
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laws,	specifically,	UNCAC,	the	AU	Convention	and	Kenyan	anti-corruption	laws.	It	assesses	
specific	provisions	useful	in	preventing	IFFs,	curbing	their	recurrence	and	repatriating	assets	
lost	through	IFFs.	
Prevention	is	a	crucial	anti-corruption	tool	which	offers	proactive	solutions	and	is	a	
crucial	first	step	in	reducing	IFFs.	Anti-corruption	laws	and	institutions	play	a	role	in	preventing	
IFFs.	Preventive	measures	ensure	that	the	grave	effects	of	corruption	are	reduced	and,	in	some	
instances,	eliminated.	Preventive	measures,	such	as	awareness	raising	and	educating	law	
enforcement	officers	and	the	public	on	the	effects	of	corruption,	also	may	play	a	significant	role	
in	encouraging	good	behaviour	that	reduces	the	occurrence	of	corrupt	activity	which	facilitates	
IFFs.	Prevention	also	strengthens	the	regulatory	ability	of	law	enforcement	and	anti-corruption	
agencies	to	implement	proactively	laws	that	mitigate	the	incidence	of	IFFs.	Unfortunately,	most	
anti-corruption	laws	focus	on	combating	corruption	ex	post	facto	instead	of	preventing	it.	The	
AU	Convention	has	no	specific	provisions	on	prevention	of	corruption,	despite	the	word	
“prevention”	being	included	in	its	title.	Similarly,	the	preamble	to	Kenya’s	Anti-Corruption	and	
Economics	Crime	Act	(ACECA)	expressly	states	that	the	Act	ensures	the	prevention	of	
corruption	and	other	related	offences.2	However,	there	are	no	express	preventive	measures	in	
the	Act.	UNCAC	is	the	first	anti-corruption	law	to	dedicate	an	entire	chapter	to	prevention	as	an	
anti-corruption	measure.3	The	chapter	provides	fundamental	steps	in	the	achievement	of	the	
objectives	of	UNCAC.4	
Prevention	of	corruption	alone	cannot	curb	the	pervasiveness	of	IFFs.	Anti-corruption	
laws	play	an	important	part	in	criminalising	corruption	and	its	role	in	facilitating	IFFs.	
Criminalisation	ensures	that	corrupt	individuals	are	punished	and	it	deters	them	and	the	
general	society	from	committing	corruption	offences.	Moreover,	criminal	prosecution	of	high-
level	individuals	on	corruption	charges	increases	the	trust	of	ordinary	people	in	the	criminal	
justice	system	and,	consequently,	their	support	in	curbing	corruption.5	Criminalising	both	the	
demand	and	supply	side	of	corruption	is	of	importance	to	anti-IFF	measures.	The	private	sector	
                                                
2	 Preamble	to	ACECA.	
3	 Chapter	2	of	UNCAC.	
4	 UNODC	(2006)	at	15.	
5	 Sandgren	(2005)	at	728.	
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is	responsible	primarily	for	the	supply	side	of	corruption.	This	form	of	corruption	is	responsible	
for	the	IFFs	related	to	abusive	commercial	practices.	The	HLP	Report	notes	that	large	
companies	engage	in	abusive	commercial	practices,	such	as	abusive	transfer	pricing,	trade	
misinvoicing	and	use	of	unequal	contracts.6	The	private	sector	therefore	largely	is	responsible	
for	the	65	per	cent	of	the	IFFs	from	Africa	occurring	through	abusive	commercial	practices.7	
Anti-corruption	laws	provide	a	legal	framework	for	tracing,	freezing	and	repatriating	
money	lost	through	IFFs.	Asset	recovery	is	crucial	for	curbing	IFFs	from	Kenya.	Firstly,	it	
potentially	can	make	available	additional	resources	to	the	government	to	run	its	programmes,	
including	ongoing	anti-IFF	measures.8	Secondly,	asset	recovery	programmes	can	deter	future	
corruption	by	sending	the	message	that	corrupt	money	cannot	be	hidden.9	This	can	reduce	
directly	the	scale	of	corruption-related	IFFs.10	Lastly,	asset	recovery	provides	a	measure	of	
justice	for	victims.11	UNCAC	is	the	first	instrument	to	make	provision	for	international	asset	
recovery.12	
Anti-corruption	laws	also	supply	the	legal	basis	for	establishing	institutions	vital	to	
implementing	laws	that	will	help	reduce	IFFs.	In	addition,	anti-corruption	laws	establish	the	
standards	necessary	for	the	effective	operation	of	these	institutions,	such	as	independence	and	
adequate	resourcing.	
The	scope	of	anti-corruption	laws	is	not	limited	to	corruption-related	IFFs.	Anti-
corruption	laws	constitute	an	extensive	legal	framework	for	curbing	the	corruption	that	
facilitates	commercial	and	criminal-related	IFFs.	For	instance,	Gallagher	notes	that:	
the	provisions	of	UNCAC	also	apply	to	the	various	forms	of	trafficking-related	
corruption	and	are	more	detailed	than	those	of	the	UNCTOC.13	
                                                
6	 HLP	(2015)	at	37.		
7	 HLP	(2015)	at	24.	
8	 Vlasic	&	Cooper	(2011)	at	99.	
9	 Vlasic	&	Cooper	(2011)	at	99.	
10	 Federal	Department	of	Foreign	Affairs	(FDFA)	(2015),	available	at	
https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/mission-
newyork/en/documents/150414_Swiss%20Working%20Paper%20AR_17%20March%202015.pdf	(visited	
10	October	2018).	
11	 Vlasic	&	Cooper	(2011)	at	99.	
12	 Chapter	V	of	UNCAC.	
13	 Gallagher	(2010)	at	446.	
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In	some	cases,	anti-corruption	laws	have	express	provisions	on	other	sources	of	IFFs.	Articles	14	
and	21	of	UNCAC,	for	example,	are	dedicated	to	preventing	money	laundering,	which	is	a	key	
driver	of	IFFs.	
3.3	 International	and	Regional	Anti-Corruption	Laws	and	Institutions	
3.3.1	 United	Nations	Convention	against	Corruption	(UNCAC)	
An	impressive	186	countries,	including	Kenya,	have	adopted	UNCAC.14	This	signifies	the	global	
acceptance	of	the	instrument	and	the	anti-corruption	principles	which	it	promotes.	UNCAC	also	
serves	as	an	important	international	instrument	to	deal	with	the	corruption	component	of	IFFs.	
Chapter	II	of	UNCAC	provides	an	important	basis	for	curtailing	IFFs	through	its	detailed	
preventive	mechanisms.	Prevention	is	a	key	factor	in	curbing	IFFs.	UNCAC	contains	prevention	
measures	which	the	public	and	private	sectors	can	adopt	to	stop	corruption.	Articles	7-11	of	
UNCAC	focus	on	preventing	public	sector	corruption	and	can	have	a	direct	impact	on	
preventing	IFFs.	UNCAC	imposes	mandatory	obligations	on	States	Parties,	like	Kenya,	to	
implement	preventive	provisions	in	the	areas	of	public	procurement,	public	finances,	
accounting	practices,	public	administration	and	judicial	corruption.	These	areas	all	focus	on	
public	money	and	may	be	prone	to	corruption-related	IFFs.	For	instance,	lack	of	transparency	in	
government	procurement	and	supply	chains	can	lead	to	corruption-related	IFFs.15	Judicial	
corruption	undermines	efforts	to	curb	IFFs	and	is	one	issue	with	which	Kenya	is	grappling.16	The	
measures	imposed	by	UNCAC	to	prevent	judicial	corruption	play	an	important	role	in	enhancing	
the	country’s	efforts	to	curb	IFFs.	
Article	12	of	UNCAC	is	an	important	provision	in	curbing	IFFs	within	the	private	sector.	A	
significant	part	of	the	private	sector	in	Africa	comprises	multinational	corporations,	
international	banks	and	international	legal	and	accounting	firms.17	The	HLP	Report	found	that	
multinational	corporations	engage	in	IFFs	through	abusive	transfer	pricing,	trade	misinvoicing,	
                                                
14	 UNODC	(2019),	available	at	https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/ratification-status.html	(visited	
18	January	2019).	
15	 HLP	(2015)	at	83.	
16	 Kiplagat	(2019),	available	at	https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Judiciary-accused-of-derailing-anti-graft-
war/1056-4917948-15jv0riz/index.html	(visited	18	January	2019).	
17	 HLP	(2015)	at	36.	
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misinvoicing	of	services	and	intangibles,	and	the	use	of	unequal	contracts.18	A	good	example	in	
Kenya	is	Karuturi	Limited,	which	the	Kenya	Revenue	Authority	found	culpable	of	transfer	
mispricing.19	Article	12	details	a	range	of	preventive	measures	that	Kenya	should	implement	to	
prevent	private	sector	corruption.	These	measures	include	enhancing	accounting	and	auditing	
standards	and	prohibiting	the	tax	deductibility	of	bribes.	
Articles	15-25	of	UNCAC	criminalise	corrupt	acts.	Criminalisation	of	corruption	is	an	
important	approach	that	Kenya	should	implement	to	curb	the	corruption	component	of	IFFs.	
Article	21	is	a	significant	provision	in	relation	to	private	sector	corruption.	It	encourages	States	
Parties	to	criminalise	both	active	and	passive	corruption	in	the	private	sector.	UNCAC	is	not	
limited	to	corruption-related	IFFs.	Article	23	criminalises	money	laundering,	which	falls	under	
the	criminal	component	of	IFFs.	Corruption	and	money	laundering	often	coexist	and	reinforce	
each	other.	
Corruption	enables	money	laundering	through	bribes	paid	to	government	agencies,	
such	as	financial	intelligence	units,	that	collect	and	analyse	suspicious	transaction	
reports,	or	to	private	individuals	and	enterprises,	who	must	file	such	reports.20	
Conversely,	money	laundering	provides	a	means	through	which	criminals	conceal	and	enjoy	
criminal	proceeds	without	revealing	the	corrupt	sources	of	the	funds.21	
UNCAC	is	designed	not	only	to	prevent	corruption	and	hold	corrupt	individuals	liable	but	
also	to	encourage	international	co-operation	in	the	fight	against	corruption.	Chapter	IV	of	
UNCAC	has	detailed	provisions	on	international	co-operation.	Article	43(1)	provides	that:	
States	Parties	shall	co-operate	in	criminal	matters	in	accordance	with	articles	44	to	
50	of	this	Convention.	Where	appropriate	and	consistent	with	their	domestic	legal	
system,	States	Parties	shall	consider	assisting	each	other	in	investigations	of	and	
proceedings	in	civil	and	administrative	matters	relating	to	corruption.	
Article	43	shows	that	international	co-operation	relates	to	both	criminal	and	civil	matters.	
However,	States	Parties	are	obligated	only	to	co-operate	in	criminal	matters	and	need	to	
consider	co-operating	in	civil	and	administrative	matters.	In	order	to	curb	IFFs	in	Kenya,	there	is	
                                                
18	 HLP	(2015)	at	37.	
19	 International	Trade	Centre	(2014),	available	at	http://www.intracen.org/itc/blog/market-insider/Tax-
authorities-investigate-flower-farms-in-Kenya/	(visited	20	May	2018).	
20	 Chaikin	(2008)	at	274.	
21	 Chaikin	(2008)	at	274.	
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a	need	for	international	information	exchange	that	reveals	illicit	Kenyan	wealth	held	offshore,	
and	reports	on	what	profits	multinational	corporations	make	in	Kenya	for	taxation	by	the	
Kenyan	revenue	authorities.22	The	UNCAC	provisions	on	international	co-operation	provide	a	
basis	for	States	Parties	to	co-operate	and	facilitate	the	secure	and	rapid	exchange	of	this	kind	of	
information.23	
Chapter	V	of	UNCAC	provides	for	asset	recovery.	Asset	recovery	is	key	to	curbing	IFFs.	It	
ensures	that	western	powers	return	stolen	assets	to	their	countries	of	origin.	Duri	has	noted	
that:	
Western	powers	have	been	complicit	in	the	fight	against	corruption	and	IFFs	
from	Africa	as	their	secrecy	jurisdictions	have	allowed	criminal	proceeds	to	
be	laundered	in	their	financial	system	with	impunity.24	
The	HLP	Report	notes	that	asset	recovery	provides	resources	that	develop	African	countries	
while	also	serving	as	a	deterrent	for	those	who	stash	illicit	gains	abroad.25	However,	even	with	
the	UNCAC	framework,	asset	recovery	remains	a	complex	process.	International	co-operation	
plays	an	important	role	in	facilitating	this	process.	“Efficient	international	co-operation	and	
rapid	exchange	of	information	between	countries	is	needed	for	successful	recovery	of	stolen	
assets.”26	
The	Kenya—Jersey	extradition	and	asset	recovery	case	study	is	a	good	example	of	the	
importance	Chapters	IV	and	V	of	UNCAC	as	legal	tools	which	Kenya	can	use	to	curb	IFFs.	In	this	
case,	the	former	managing	director	of	the	Kenya	Power	and	Lighting	Company	(KPLC),	Mr	
Samuel	Gichuru,	and	the	former	Minister	of	Energy,	Mr	Chris	Okemo,	faced	corruption	and	
money	laundering	charges	in	Jersey.	The	two	allegedly	had	used	a	proxy	company,	Windward	
Trading	Limited,	to	squander	public	funds	worth	millions	of	Kenya	shillings.27	According	to	
Jersey	Court	papers,	Mr	Gichuru,	using	his	position	as	managing	director	of	KPLC,	allegedly	
                                                
22	 Fröberg	&	Waris	(2011)	at	53.	
23	 Article	48	of	UNCAC.	
24	 Duri	(2018)	at	343.	
25	 HLP	(2015)	at	46.	
26	 Duri	(2018)	at	343.	
27	 Chrysanthus	Barnabus	Okemo	&	another	v	Attorney	General	&	3	others	(2018)	at	para	3.	
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accepted	bribes	from	foreign	businesses	which	contracted	with	the	company.28	These	bribes	
were	paid	into	an	account	in	Jersey	and	then	into	an	account	in	the	name	of	Windward	Trading	
Limited.29	Mr	Okemo	allegedly	received	kickbacks	from	Windward	Trading	Limited	in	the	years	
between	1999	and	2001.30	
In	accordance	with	Article	44	of	UNCAC,	Jersey	authorities	issued	a	request	to	Kenya	to	
extradite	the	two	suspects.31	However,	the	Court	of	Appeal	of	Kenya	has	halted	the	extradition	
request,	although	the	High	Court	of	Kenya	had	validated	it.32	The	matter	is	now	before	the	
Supreme	Court	of	Kenya	awaiting	determination.33	In	the	meantime,	the	current	Director	of	
Public	Prosecutions	in	Kenya,	Mr	Noordin	Haji,	will	travel	to	the	Island	of	Jersey	to	discuss	with	
his	counterparts	how	to	remove	the	extant	legal	impediments	to	the	extradition	process.34	
On	24	February	2016,	Windward	Trading	Limited	pleaded	guilty	to	four	counts	of	money	
laundering.35	In	his	ruling	granting	the	confiscation	orders	sought	by	the	Attorney	General	of	
Jersey,	Judge	Julian	Clyde-Smith	said:	
The	defendant	company	received	and	held	the	proceeds	of	criminal	conduct	
perpetrated	by	its	controlling	mind	and	beneficial	owner,	Samuel	Gichuru.	The	
company	knowingly	enabled	Gichuru	to	obtain	substantial	bribes	paid	to	him	while	
he	held	public	office	in	Kenya.	The	company	played	a	vital	role	without	which	
corruption	on	a	grand	scale	is	impossible:	money	laundering.36	
Kenya	and	Jersey	subsequently	agreed	to	the	return	of	stolen	assets	from	Jersey	to	Kenya.	On	
11	December	2018,	the	governments	of	Kenya	and	Jersey	signed	an	agreement,	titled	the	
Framework	for	Return	of	Assets	from	Corruption	and	Crime	(FRACCK).37	This	was	a	significant	
                                                
28	 Barclays	Wealth	Directors	(Jersey)	Limited	and	Barclays	Wealth	Corporate	Officers	(Jersey)	Limited	
Representors	v	Her	Majesty’s	Attorney	General	(2015)	at	para	5.	
29	 Barclays	Wealth	Directors	(Jersey)	Limited	and	Barclays	Wealth	Corporate	Officers	(Jersey)	Limited	
Representors	v	Her	Majesty’s	Attorney	General	(2015)	at	para	5.	
30	 Chrysanthus	Barnabus	Okemo	&another	v	Attorney	General	&	3	others	(2018)	at	para	3.	
31	 UNODC	(2015)	at	151.	
32	 Chrysanthus	Barnabus	Okemo	&another	v	Attorney	General	&	3	others	(2018)	at	para	54.	
33	 Muraya	(2019),	available	at	https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2019/03/dpp-headed-to-jersey-in-pursuit-
of-justice-in-okemo-gichuru-case/	(visited	7	April	2019).	
34	 Muraya	(2019),	available	at	https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2019/03/dpp-headed-to-jersey-in-pursuit-
of-justice-in-okemo-gichuru-case/	(visited	7	April	2019).	
35	 The	Attorney	General	v	Windward	Trading	Limited	(2016)	at	para	1.	
36	 The	Attorney	General	v	Windward	Trading	Limited	(2016)	at	para	1.	
37	 Agutu	(2018),	available	at	available	at	https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2018-12-11-kenya-jersey-sign-
pact-to-return-sh516m-graft-proceeds/	(visited	31	March	2019).	
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achievement	for	Kenya.	It	served	as	an	example	of	how	Kenya	may	use	legal	tools	as	restitution	
mechanisms	for	IFFs	and	proceeds	of	corruption.	
3.3.2	 African	Union	Convention	on	Preventing	and	Combating	Corruption	(AU	Convention)	
Kenya	became	a	State	Party	to	the	AU	Convention	on	17	December	2003.38	The	AU	Convention	
plays	an	important	role	in	curbing	IFFs	from	Kenya.	To	begin	with,	the	Convention	defines	
corruption	by	giving	examples	of	corrupt	acts	and	practices.39	This	ostensive	definition	allows	
for	the	criminalisation	of	specific	corrupt	acts	such	as	bribery,	illicit	enrichment,	embezzlement	
of	public	funds	and	laundering	of	proceeds	of	corruption.	As	discussed	in	§3.2	above,	
criminalising	corruption	curtails	the	corruption	component	of	IFFs.	
The	AU	Convention	also	sets	out	specific	measures	which	States	Parties,	like	Kenya,	
should	take	to	curb	corruption.	For	instance,	the	Convention	requires	States	Parties	to	establish	
and	strengthen	independent	anti-corruption	agencies.40	Kenya	has	met	this	obligation	by	
establishing	the	Ethics	and	Anti-Corruption	Commission.	Article	5(4)	of	the	AU	Convention	
requires	States	Parties	to	adopt	measures	to	create	and	strengthen	internal	accounting,	
auditing	and	follow-up	systems,	particularly	regarding	public	finances	and	procurement	
processes.	The	AU	Convention	also	requires	States	Parties	to	implement	measures	that	protect	
whistleblowers	and	witnesses	of	corruption.41	These	measures	are	important	in	curbing	the	
corruption	component	of	IFFs.	Establishing	anti-corruption	agencies,	for	instance,	sets	up	the	
institutional	framework	needed	to	curb	corruption.	Protecting	whistleblowers	and	witnesses	
encourages	citizens	to	report	incidents	of	corruption.	
Article	11	of	the	AU	Convention	seeks	to	prevent	and	combat	acts	of	corruption	and	
related	offences	in	the	private	sector,	and	is	particularly	important	in	curbing	IFFs	from	Kenya.	
Thus,	Article	11(2)	requires	States	Parties	to	establish	mechanisms	which	encourage	the	private	
sector	to	participate	in	the	fight	against	unfair	competition	and	to	respect	tender	procedures	
and	property	rights.	And	Article	11(3)	requires	States	Parties	to	adopt	measures	which	prevent	
                                                
38	 African	Union	(2019),	available	at	https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7786-sl	
	 african_union_convention_on_preventing_and_combating_corruption.pdf	(visited	12	December	2018).	
39	 Article	1	and	Article	4	of	the	AU	Convention.	
40	 Article	5(3)	of	the	AU	Convention.	
41	 Article	5(5)-(6)	of	the	AU	Convention.	
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companies	from	paying	bribes	in	order	to	win	tenders.	
Article	12	highlights	the	importance	of	involving	civil	society	and	the	media	in	the	fight	
against	corruption.	This	creates	an	enabling	environment	to	hold	governments	to	the	highest	
levels	of	transparency	and	accountability	in	the	management	of	public	affairs.	Like	UNCAC,	the	
AU	Convention	has	specific	articles	on	asset	recovery	and	international	co-operation.42	
3.3.3	 African	Union	Advisory	Board	on	Corruption	
Article	22	of	the	AU	Convention	establishes	the	African	Union	Advisory	Board	on	Corruption	
(AU	Board).	The	AU	Convention	further	stipulates	the	functions	of	the	AU	Board,	which	are	to	
promote	the	adoption	of	anti-corruption	measures	in	Africa,	to	advise	governments	on	how	to	
deal	with	corruption	and	related	offences	in	their	domestic	jurisdictions,	and	to	build	
partnerships	with	relevant	stakeholders	to	facilitate	dialogue	in	the	fight	against	corruption	and	
related	offences.43	
The	AU	Convention	does	not	mention	what	role	the	AU	Board	should	play	in	curbing	
IFFs.	However,	the	AU	Board	can	interpret	the	AU	Convention	innovatively.	For	instance,	in	
interpreting	Article	22(5)(b)	&	(c),	the	AU	Board	can	collect	and	document	information	on	the	
extent	to	which	corruption	has	enabled	the	prevalence	of	IFFs	in	Africa	and	develop	
methodologies	for	curbing	corruption.	In	fact,	the	HLP	Report	recommends	that	the	AU	should	
amend	Article	22	of	the	AU	Convention	to	allow	it	to:	“Develop	methodologies	for	analysing	the	
nature	and	extent	of	illicit	financial	flows	from	Africa,	and	disseminate	information	and	
sensitise	the	public	on	the	negative	effects	of	illicit	financial	flows	from	Africa.”44	
Article	22(5)(e)	is	also	important	to	the	AU	Board	as	regards	the	curbing	of	IFFs.	It	
provides	that	one	function	of	the	AU	Board	is	to	collect	information	and	analyse	the	conduct	
and	behaviour	of	multinational	corporations	operating	in	Africa	and	to	disseminate	such	
information	to	specified	national	authorities.45	Multinational	corporations	are	the	main	culprits	
when	it	comes	to	IFFs:	instead	of	paying	the	taxes	they	owe	in	the	countries	in	which	they	
                                                
42	 Articles	16	and	19	of	the	AU	Convention.	
43	 Article	22(5)	of	the	AU	Convention.	
44	 HLP	(2015)	at	84.	
45	 Article	22(5)(e)	of	the	AU	Convention.	
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generate	income,	they	shift	every	expense	and	cost	to	those	countries	and	move	the	profits	to	
their	home	countries.	The	AU	Board	therefore	can	play	a	crucial	role	in	analysing	the	conduct	of	
multinational	corporations	operating	in	African	countries,	including	Kenya,	and	reporting	any	
suspicious	activity	to	the	relevant	national	authorities.	
The	AU	Board	already	has	taken	concrete	steps	to	offer	institutional	support	in	curbing	
IFFs	from	African	countries	like	Kenya.	Its	2018—2022	Strategic	Plan	provides	that	under	its	
approach	of	enhancing	the	legal	framework	to	combat	corruption,	the	AU	Board	will	develop	
strategies	to	address	the	corruption	component	of	IFFs.46	The	AU	Board	will	implement	these	
strategies	through	integrating	IFFs	into	Article	22	(as	proposed	by	the	HLP),	ensuring	that	the	
minimum	number	of	States	Parties	ratify	this	amendment,	and	developing	an	IFF	programme	
within	the	Secretariat	of	the	Board.47	The	IFF	programme	will	implement	activities	relating	to	
the	development	of	model	laws	around	government	procurement,	the	enhancement	of	public	
access	to	national	budgets,	and	the	promotion	of	public	awareness	activities	aimed	at	detailing	
the	economic,	social	and	political	impact	of	IFFs.48	
3.4	 Kenyan	Anti-Corruption	Laws	and	Institutions	
3.4.1	 Constitution	of	Kenya,	2010	
The	Constitution	of	Kenya	is	the	Supreme	law	of	the	country.49	Any	Kenyan	law	that	contradicts	
the	Constitution	is	void.	It	is	also	the	source	of	all	economic,	political,	social	and	legal	policies	
and	regulations.50	The	executive,	the	judiciary	and	the	legislature	cannot	act	against	its	
provisions.	The	Constitution	therefore	forms	an	important	basis	of	Kenya’s	anti-corruption	laws	
and	institutions.	
Article	10	of	the	Constitution	stipulates	the	national	values	and	principles	of	governance	
to	which	state	organs,	state	officers	and	public	officers	should	adhere	when	interpreting	
national	laws	and	implementing	public	policy	decisions.	These	values	are	good	governance,	
                                                
46	 AU	Board	(2017)	at	22.	
47	 AU	Board	(2017)	at	29.	
48	 AU	Board	(2017)	at	30.	
49	 Dragne	(2013)	at	40.	
50	 Dragne	(2013)	at	41.	
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integrity,	transparency	and	accountability.51	The	national	values	and	principles	enshrined	in	
Article	10	are	prerequisites	for	implementing	anti-corruption	and	anti-IFF	measures	in	Kenya.	
Transparency	is	important	to	all	anti-IFF	efforts	since	the	main	goal	of	criminals	is	to	hide	
wealth.52		Good	governance	will	discourage	IFFs	and	render	it	difficult	to	make	money	through	
illicit	business.53	
Chapter	Six	of	the	Constitution	aims	at	promoting	good	governance	among	state	officers	
by	prescribing	the	principles	of	leadership	and	integrity.	Article	73	considers	state	officers	to	be	
bearers	of	the	public	trust	who	are	accountable	to	the	public.54	One	of	the	guiding	principles	of	
leadership	and	integrity	is	“objectivity	and	impartiality	in	decision-making,	and	in	ensuring	that	
decisions	are	not	influenced	by	nepotism,	favouritism,	other	improper	motives	or	corrupt	
practices”.55	Article	73	can	be	read	with	Article	232,	which	provides	that	the	public	service	
should	operate	according	to	high	standards	of	professional	ethics.	These	principles	are	key	in	
reducing	IFFs,	since	corrupt	practices	of	state	officers	and	the	public	service	play	a	substantial	
role	in	facilitating	IFFs	from	Kenya.	The	High	Court	of	Kenya	confirmed	the	importance	of	
Chapter	Six	and,	specifically,	Article	73	in	the	case	of	Trusted	Society	of	Human	Rights	Alliance	v	
Attorney	General	&	2	others.	The	Court	held	that:	
The	people	of	Kenya	did	not	intend	that	these	provisions	on	integrity	and	suitability	
for	public	offices	be	merely	suggestions,	superfluous	or	ornamental;	they	did	not	
intend	to	include	these	provisions	as	lofty	aspirations	…	They	desired	these	
collective	commitments	to	ensure	good	governance	in	the	Republic	will	be	put	into	
practice.56	
Chapter	Six	also	prohibits	state	officers	from	receiving	gifts	or	donations,	from	maintaining	
bank	accounts	outside	Kenya	(unless	allowed	by	an	Act	of	parliament),	and	from	seeking	or	
accepting	personal	loans	or	benefits	that	would	compromise	their	integrity.57	This	provision	is	
crucial	in	curtailing	corruption,	money	laundering	and	other	activities	which	facilitate	IFFs.	
Maintaining	a	bank	account	outside	Kenya,	particularly	in	a	tax	haven,	is	one	way	in	which	
                                                
51	 Article	10(2)(c)	of	the	Constitution.	
52	 HLP	(2015)	at	45.	
53	 HLP	(2015)	at	41.	
54	 Akech	(2011)	at	386.	
55	 Article	73(2)(b)	of	the	Constitution.		
56	 Trusted	Society	of	Human	Rights	Alliance	v	Attorney	General	&	2	others	(2012)	at	37.	
57	 Article	76	of	the	Constitution.	
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money	illicitly	flows	out	of	Kenya.	In	2016,	the	International	Consortium	of	Investigative	
Journalists	leaked	a	set	of	papers	known	as	the	Panama	Papers	which	implicated	191	Kenyans	
in	opening	companies	and	bank	accounts	in	Panama,	a	notorious	tax	haven.58	Those	named	
included	the	then	Deputy	Chief	Justice,	Kalpana	Rawal.	The	Panama	Papers	alleged	that	during	
her	tenure,	Justice	Rawal	was	the	director	of	certain	companies	registered	in	Panama.59	If	the	
allegations	are	true,	Justice	Rawal	would	have	contravened	Article	76	of	the	Constitution.	
Article	79	provides	the	legal	basis	for	the	establishment	of	the	Ethics	and	Anti-
Corruption	Commission	(EACC)	as	an	independent	body.	It	is	imperative	that	the	Constitution	
guarantees	the	independence	of	the	EACC,	since	it	is	a	prerequisite	of	an	effective	anti-
corruption	agency.	
Article	244	of	the	Constitution	provides	that	“one	of	the	objectives	of	the	national	police	
service	is	to	prevent	corruption	and	promote	and	practise	transparency	and	accountability”.	
We	can	interpret	this	provision	in	two	ways.	Firstly,	the	police	are	obligated	to	prevent	
corruption	in	the	public	domain.	Secondly,	the	police	are	obligated	to	prevent	corruption	and	
promote	transparency	within	the	police	force.	The	Kenya	national	police	service	is	amongst	the	
public	institutions	most	affected	by	corruption.60	This	provision	is	important	in	curtailing	IFFs	
since	the	police	play	a	crucial	role	in	prosecuting	perpetrators	of	IFFs	and	recovering	the	lost	
funds.	The	role	of	the	police	is	not	limited	to	corruption-related	IFFs.	They	also	play	an	
important	role	in	arresting	and	prosecuting	persons	engaging	in	transnational	crimes	and	
facilitating	corrupt	activities.	
Article	71	is	an	important	constitutional	provision	on	natural	resource	governance.	The	
article	specifies	that	Parliament	should	ratify	agreements	relating	to	the	exploitation	of	any	
natural	resources	in	Kenya.	The	HLP	found	that	more	than	half	of	the	IFFs	from	the	continent	
(56.2	per	cent)	derive	from	the	extractive	industries,	including	mining.61	Corruption	plays	a	role	
in	facilitating	these	IFFs.	Grand	corruption	is	evident	in	the	awarding	of	mining	rights,	while	
                                                
58	 ICIJ	(2017),	available	at	https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/	(visited	20	August	2018).	
59	 ANCIR	(2016),	available	at	https://panamapapers.investigativecenters.org/kenya/	(visited	15	October	
2018).	
60	 Martini	(2012)	at	4.	
61	 HLP	(2015)	at	97.	
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petty	corruption	usually	is	observed	amongst	tax	officials.62	The	HLP	noted	that	the	awarding	of	
mining	contracts	is	“shrouded	in	secrecy	and	fuelled	by	bribes	to	circumvent	existing	legal	
provisions	for	the	payment	of	royalties	and	taxes”.63	The	constitutional	requirement	of	
parliamentary	ratification	of	mining	contracts	is	an	important	step	in	encouraging	transparency	
in	the	awarding	of	mining	rights	and	discouraging	corruption	and	related	IFFs	in	the	extractive	
industry.	
The	Constitution	identifies	principles	and	values	that	will	enhance	anti-corruption	
mechanisms	in	Kenya.	However,	the	Constitution	alone	will	not	promote	good	governance.64	
The	necessary	national	laws	aligned	to	its	values	and	principles	should	support	the	
Constitution.65	
3.4.2	 Anti-Corruption	and	Economic	Crimes	Act,	2003	
The	Anti-Corruption	and	Economic	Crimes	Act	(ACECA)	is	the	main	domestic	law	governing	the	
prevention,	investigation	and	punishment	of	corruption	and	other	economic	crimes	in	Kenya.66	
ACECA	has	an	ostensive	definition	of	corruption	and	economic	crimes.	The	corruption	offences	
prohibited	are	bribery,	fraud,	embezzlement	of	public	funds,	abuse	of	office,	breach	of	trust,	
bid	rigging,	conflict	of	interest,	soliciting	benefits	and	dishonesty	related	to	any	tax	levied	under	
Kenyan	law.67	The	economic	crimes	prohibited	by	ACECA	are	stipulated	in	Section	2	and	Section	
45.	The	limitation	of	the	ostensive	approach	is	that	conduct	not	expressly	prohibited	is	not	
considered	corruption	or	an	economic	crime.	
Despite	this	limitation,	ACECA	goes	a	long	way	in	curbing	corruption-related	IFFs	and	
limiting	the	role	of	corruption	in	enabling	other	IFFs.	For	example,	Section	44,	which	
criminalises	bid	rigging,	and	Section	45(2)(b),	which	criminalises	wilful	or	careless	failure	to	
follow	procurement	and	tender	contracting,	are	important	in	reducing	the	use	of	unequal	
contracts.	Unequal	contracts	are	a	harmful	aspect	of	commercial	IFFs,	particularly	in	the	
                                                
62	 OECD	(2016a)	at	9.	
63	 HLP	(2015)	at	31.	
64	 Akech	(2011)	at	394.	
65	 Akech	(2011)	at	394.	
66	 Preamble	to	ACECA.	
67	 Section	2	of	ACECA.	
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extractive	industry.68	These	contracts	often	result	from	bribes	paid	to	public	officers	and	involve	
the	award	of	a	resource	concession	that	is	substantially	lower	than	the	amount	bid	or,	in	the	
case	of	public	procurement,	overpaying	for	goods	and	services.69	Also,	Section	45(1)(d)	
criminalises	failing	to	pay	taxes	or	fraudulently	obtaining	an	exemption	to	pay	taxes.	This	
provision	is	useful	in	limiting	tax-related	IFFs	such	as	tax	evasion.	
Sections	27	and	28	of	ACECA	are	also	important	in	curbing	IFFs	from	Kenya.	Section	
27(3)	provides	that:	
the	EACC	may	by	notice	in	writing	require	any	person	to	provide,	within	a	
reasonable	time	specified	in	the	notice,	any	information	or	documents	in	the	
person’s	possession	that	relate	to	a	person	suspected	of	corruption	or	economic	
crime.	
Section	28(7)	provides	for	production	of	specific	records	which	are	bank	accounts,	legal	or	
business	documents	and	correspondence	that	is	not	of	a	strictly	personal	nature.	Adequate	
information	on	IFFs	is	key	to	curbing	them.	The	HLP	Report	noted	that	it	is	difficult	to	acquire	
ample	information	about	IFFs	because	the	culprits	take	deliberate	measures	to	hide	them.70	
This	section	empowers	the	EACC	to	obtain	information	which	may	be	vital	in	tracking	IFFs	and	
the	culprits	driving	them.	
ACECA	also	provides	for	the	establishments	of	a	number	of	institutions	vital	to	
implementing	anti-corruption	laws.	Section	3	caters	for	the	appointment	of	special	magistrates	
to	hear	and	determine	cases	of	corruption	and	other	economic	crimes.	Section	16	sets	up	the	
Kenya	Anti-Corruption	Advisory	Board,	the	primary	function	of	which	is	to	advice	the	EACC.71	
Although	the	Board	comprises	representatives	of	key	institutions	relevant	to	reducing	
corruption,	it	lacks	a	representative	of	the	Financial	Reporting	Centre,	which	plays	an	important	
role	in	preventing	and	curbing	money	laundering	in	Kenya.	
Section	23(1)	of	ACECA	provides	that	the	secretary	of	the	EACC,	or	a	person	appointed	
by	the	secretary,	can	investigate	corruption	and	economic	crimes.	Specialised	investigations	are	
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69	 UNECA	(2018)	at	13.	
70	 HLP	(2015)	at	3.	
71	 Section	17	of	ACECA.	
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important	in	the	successful	prosecution	of	corruption	and	related	IFFs.	Section	23(3)	stipulates	
that:	
the	Secretary	and	an	investigator	shall	have	the	powers,	privileges	and	immunities	
of	a	police	officer	in	addition	to	any	other	powers	the	Secretary	or	investigator	has	
under	this	Part.	
This	section	enhances	the	effectiveness	and	efficiency	of	investigations	into	corruption	and	
other	economic	crimes.	
Section	65	of	ACECA	protects	the	identity	of	informers	and	shields	them	from	
disciplinary	action.	Informers,	also	called	whistleblowers,	expose	corruption	in	the	private	and	
public	sectors	and	help	save	billions	of	dollars	in	public	funds	while	preventing	future	incidents	
of	corruption.	Protecting	whistleblowers	facilitates	the	reporting	of	corruption-related	IFFs	and	
assists	in	the	successful	investigation	and	prosecution	of	IFFs	and	related	offences.	Section	56	
of	ACECA	stipulates	the	procedure	of	asset	recovery.	Asset	recovery	is	important	because	
corruption	and	IFFs	are	driven	by	the	desire	to	make	money.	
The	main	shortcoming	of	ACECA	is	that	it	lacks	the	element	of	corporate	criminal	
liability.	Corporate	criminal	liability	is	vital	in	curbing	IFFs.	Multinational	corporations	are	the	
main	drivers	of	commercial	IFFs.	Kenya	needs	to	amend	ACECA	and	impose	civil	sanctions	on	
multinational	corporations	which	engage	in	corrupt	activities	while	operating	in	the	country.	
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3.4.3	 Bribery	Act,	2016	
The	Bribery	Act	is	a	relatively	new	law	that	came	into	force	on	13	January	2017.	The	Act	
specifically	provides	for	the	prevention,	investigation	and	punishment	of	bribery.72	It	focuses	on	
bribery	within	private	entities.73	Section	2	of	the	Act	describes	a	private	entity	as	“any	person	or	
organisation,	not	being	a	public	entity,	and	includes	corporate	bodies	however	established	
which	carry	on	business,	or	part	of	business,	in	Kenya”.	This	section	is	important	because	it	
makes	clear	that	the	Act	applies	also	to	multinational	corporations.	
Section	9	is	a	progressive	provision.	It	obligates	directors	or	senior	officers	of	public	and	
private	entities	to	put	in	place	measures	to	prevent	bribery	in	their	organisations.	The	Act	also	
imposes	a	duty	on	private	and	public	persons	holding	a	position	of	authority	within	their	
organisations	to	report	to	the	EACC,	within	twenty	four	hours,	any	knowledge	or	suspicion	of	
bribery.74	The	Act	protects	persons	who	report	bribery,	including	whistleblowers	and	witnesses,	
from	intimidation	and	harassment.75	
This	Act	plays	a	crucial	role	in	curtailing	IFFs	from	Kenya.	The	HLP	noted	in	its	findings	
that	corruption	was	not	limited	to	the	public	sector.76	The	HLP	Report	remarked	that:	
there	are	both	demand	and	supply	sides	to	bribery,	which	is	why	the	legislation	in	
some	developed	countries	against	the	giving	of	bribes	by	companies	makes	an	
important	contribution	to	stemming	corrupt	practices	in	Africa.77	
The	Bribery	Act	is	an	example	of	such	legislation.	
3.4.4	 Public	Officer	Ethics	Act,	2003	
The	Public	Officer	Ethics	Act	aims	at:	
advancing	the	ethics	of	public	officers	by	providing	for	a	Code	of	Conduct	and	Ethics	
for	public	officers	and	requiring	financial	declarations	from	certain	public	officers.78	
                                                
72	 Preamble	to	the	Bribery	Act.	
73	 Section	4	of	the	Bribery	Act.	
74	 Section	14(1)	of	the	Bribery	Act.	
75	 Section	21	of	the	Bribery	Act.	
76	 HLP	(2015)	at	32.	
77	 HLP	(2015)	at	32.	
78	 Preamble	to	the	Public	Officer	Ethics	Act.	
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
	 42	
The	Act	stipulates	that	the	public	commissions	responsible	for	the	different	public	officers	are	
required	to	establish	specific	Codes	of	Conduct	and	Ethics.79	These	public	commissions	include	
the	Public	Service	Commission,	the	Judicial	Service	Commission,	the	Parliamentary	Service	
Commission	and	the	Committee	of	the	National	Assembly	responsible	for	the	ethics	of	
members.80	
For	instance,	the	Judicial	Service	Commission	has	established	the	Judicial	Service	Code	
of	Conduct	and	Ethics,	2003.81	Rule	11(2)	of	the	Code	prohibits	judicial	officers	from	accepting	
any	kind	of	benefit	from	corporations.	It	is	evident,	therefore,	that	these	codes	can	be	useful	in	
curbing	IFFs	from	Kenya	by	prohibiting	corruption	in	the	public	service.	They	bind	public	officers	
to	act	ethically	and	can	be	a	positive	stimulus	for	non-corrupt	conduct	within	the	public	sector.	
They	can	be	used	also	as	a	basis	for	investigating	and	punishing	unethical	conduct.82	
Unfortunately,	the	Act	only	applies	to	public	officers.	However,	these	codes	of	ethics	can	be	a	
useful	anti-corruption	tool	in	the	private	sector,	particularly	when	adopted	and	applied	by	
professionals	such	as	accountants,	auditors	and	lawyers	who	often	provide	technical	and	legal	
support	to	corrupt	individuals,	tax	evaders	and	money	launderers.	
Section	14	of	the	Act	prohibits	public	officers	from	furthering	the	interests	of	a	foreign	
government,	organisation	or	individual	in	a	way	that	may	be	detrimental	to	the	security	
interests	of	Kenya.83	Public	officers	can	further	the	interests	of	foreign	organisations,	such	as	
multinational	corporations,	by	allowing	them	to	evade	tax.	IFFs	are	a	threat	to	national	security.	
They	help	organised	gangs	move	and	spend	their	illegal	gains.84	They	are	also	integral	to	the	
financing	of	terrorism.85	This	section	is	therefore	very	important	in	prohibiting	behaviour	
encouraging	IFFs	that	may	pose	a	threat	to	national	security.	
                                                
79	 Section	5(1)	of	the	Public	Officer	Ethics	Act.	
80	 Section	3	of	the	Public	Officer	Ethics	Act.	
81	 Legal	Notice	50	of	2003.		
82	 Illinois	Institute	of	Technology	(2018),	available	at	http://ethics.iit.edu/ecodes/codefunctions	(visited	20	
October	2018).		
83	 Section	14(1)	of	the	Public	Officer	Ethics	Act.	
84	 Vittori	(2018)	at	38.	
85	 Vittori	(2018)	at	38.	
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Section	26	of	the	Act	stipulates	that	“every	public	officer	shall	declare	annually	their	
income,	assets	and	liabilities	and	that	of	their	spouse	or	spouses	and	their	dependent	children	
under	the	age	of	18	years”.86	Assets	declarations	by	public	officials	are	a	powerful	anti-
corruption	tool	that	can	deter	and	detect	incidents	of	illicit	enrichment.	
From	the	above	analysis,	it	is	evident	that	the	Public	Officer	Ethics	Act	is	a	crucial	law	in	
curbing	IFFs	facilitated	by	public	officers.	
3.4.5	 Leadership	and	Integrity	Act,	2012	
The	Leadership	and	Integrity	Act	is	an	important	anti-corruption	law	that	codifies	Chapter	Six	of	
the	Constitution.	Section	3	of	the	Act	states	that	“the	main	purpose	of	the	Act	is	to	ensure	that	
State	officers	respect	the	values,	principles	and	requirements	of	the	Constitution”.87	An	
important	provision	of	the	Act	is	Section	37,	which	establishes	leadership	and	integrity	codes	in	
the	public	sector	in	line	with	the	Act	and	Chapter	Six	of	the	Constitution.	
3.4.6	 Public	Procurement	and	Disposal	Act,	2005	
The	Public	Procurement	and	Disposal	Act	is	a	law	which:	
establishes	procedures	for	efficient	public	procurement	and	for	the	disposal	of	
unserviceable,	obsolete	or	surplus	stores,	assets	and	equipment	by	public	entities.88	
It	governs	procurement	procedures	in	Kenya	and	ensures	that	there	is	transparency	in	these	
procedures.	Public	procurement	is	the	main	avenue	through	which	the	public	sector	and	the	
private	sector	interact.	According	to	the	OECD,	public	procurement	is	one	of	the	government	
activities	that	is	most	susceptible	to	corruption.89	
Opaque	government	procurement	and	supply	chains	facilitate	IFFs	from	Africa.90	Part	V	
of	the	Public	Procurement	and	Disposal	Act	provides	for	open	tendering	which	increases	
transparency	within	Kenya’s	public	procurement	activities.	Sections	40	&	41	of	the	Act	also	
                                                
86	 Section	26(1)	of	the	Public	Officer	Ethics	Act.	
87	 Section	3(1)	of	the	Leadership	and	Integrity	Act.	
88	 Preamble	to	the	Public	Procurement	and	Disposal	Act.	
89	 OECD	(2016b)	at	6.	
90	 HLP	(2015)	at	83.	
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prohibit	corruption	and	fraud	within	any	procurement	procedures.	These	provisions	promote	
transparency,	which	help	reduce	IFFs.	
3.4.7	 Proceeds	of	Crime	and	Anti-Money	Laundering	Act,	2009	
The	Proceeds	of	Crime	and	Anti-Money	Laundering	Act	is	an	important	tool	in	Kenya’s	effort	to	
fight	corruption	as	it	ensures	that	corrupt	proceeds	are	not	beyond	the	reach	of	government	
authorities.	Section	2	of	the	Act	provides	that	a	predicate	offence	for	money	laundering	in	
Kenya	is	an	offence	against	a	provision	of	any	law	in	Kenya.	Corruption	is	an	offence	according	
to	ACECA	and	therefore	qualifies	as	predicate	offence	for	money	laundering.	
3.5	 Kenyan	Anti-Corruption	Institutions	
3.5.1	 Ethics	and	Anti-Corruption	Commission	of	Kenya	
The	Ethics	and	Anti-Corruption	Commission	is	an	important	regulatory	body	that	enforces	anti-
corruption	law	and	anti-IFF	measures	in	Kenya.	The	Commission	derives	its	powers	from	the	
Constitution,	the	Ethics	and	Anti-Corruption	Commission	Act	(EACC	Act)	and	ACECA.	
An	important	power	of	the	Commission	is	to	undertake	preventive	measures	against	
corrupt	practices.91	Efforts	to	curb	IFFs	should	begin	with	preventive	measures.	One	function	of	
the	Commission	is	to	“raise	public	awareness	on	ethical	issues	and	educate	the	public	on	the	
dangers	of	corruption	and	enlist	and	foster	public	support	in	combating	corruption”.92	
Members	of	the	public	have	a	responsibility	to	prevent	public	and	private	sector	corruption.93	
Article	252	of	the	Constitution	empowers	the	Commission	to	conduct	investigations	on	
its	own	initiative	or	as	a	follow-up	to	a	complaint	made	by	a	member	of	the	public.94	The	EACC	
Act	also	provides	for	this	power	under	Section	13(2)(c).	In	order	to	curb	IFFs,	it	is	important	for	
the	Commission	to	broaden	its	investigations	beyond	corruption	cases.	Investigations	plays	a	
crucial	role	in	tracking	IFFs	and	recovering	the	stolen	money.	However,	investigating	corruption	
is	challenging	task.	
                                                
91	 Section	13(2)(b)	of	the	EACC	Act.	
92	 Section	11(1)(h)	of	the	EACC	Act.	
93	 Lashin	(2014),	available	at	https://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/citizens-are-key-fight-against-
corruption	(visited	5	January	2018)	
94	 Article	252(1)(a)	of	the	Constitution.	
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There	is	often	no	scene	of	the	crime,	no	fingerprint,	no	eye-witness	to	follow	up.	It	is	
by	nature	a	very	secretive	crime	and	can	involve	just	two	satisfied	parties,	so	there	
is	no	incentive	to	divulge	the	truth.95	
However,	the	EACC	Act	and	ACECA	can	mitigate	this	challenge.	The	EACC	Act	empowers	the	
Commission	to	hire	expert	investigators	to	conduct	its	investigations.96	The	Commission	should	
utilise	this	power	to	appoint	experts	who	will	focus	on	crimes	related	to	IFFs.	ACECA	empowers	
the	Commission	to	discontinue	investigations	or	negotiate	out-of-court	settlements	in	criminal	
and	civil	proceedings	in	specific	circumstances,	such	as	when	a	suspect	makes	a	full	and	true	
disclosure	of	all	material	facts	relating	to	past	corruption	or	economic	crime	and	has	paid	or	
refunded	any	property	or	money	obtained	corruptly.97	This	will	encourage	suspects	to	assist	in	
the	investigation	of	corrupt	conduct.	
Section	32	of	ACECA	stipulates	that	the	Commission	has	police	powers.	The	section	
provides	that:	
the	Secretary	of	the	Commission	and	investigators	shall	have	power	to	arrest	any	
person	for	and	charge	them	with	an	offence,	and	to	detain	them	for	an	
investigation,	to	the	like	extent	as	a	police	officer.98	
The	Commission	provides	institutional	support	in	the	recovery	of	assets	lost	through	IFFs.	
Section	11(1)(j)	of	the	EACC	Act	empowers	the	Commission	to:	
institute	and	conduct	proceedings	in	court	for	the	recovery	or	protection	of	public	
property,	or	for	the	freeze[ing],	or	confiscation	of	proceeds	of	corruption	or	related	
to	corruption,	or	the	payment	of	compensation,	or	other	punitive	and	disciplinary	
measures.99	
The	Commission	remains	an	important	institution	that	the	Kenyan	government	can	use	to	curb	
IFFs.	The	former	chairperson	of	the	Commission,	Mr	Mumo	Matemu,	noted	that	the	
Commission	already	is	implementing	diverse	strategies	aimed	at	curbing	and	preventing	IFFs.100	
	 	
                                                
95	 Man-Wai	(2009)	at	140.	
96	 Section	13(2)(e)	of	the	EACC	Act.	
97	 Sections	26A	and	56B	of	ACECA.	
98	 Section	32	of	ACECA.	
99	 Section	11(1)(j)	of	the	EACC	Act.	
100	 Matemu	(2013),	available	at	http://www.eacc.go.ke/PRESSRELEASES.ASP?ID=476&cat=speeches	(visited	
30	January	2018).	
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3.5.2	 Office	of	the	Director	of	Public	Prosecution	
The	Office	of	the	Director	of	Public	Prosecution	(ODPP)	is	a	constitutionally	established	office	
that	is	mandated	primarily	to	exercise	state	powers	of	prosecution.101	The	EACC,	although	
empowered	to	investigate	and	arrest	persons	suspected	of	corruption	and	other	economic	
crimes,	does	not	have	prosecutorial	powers.	The	EACC	and	the	ODPP	therefore	need	to	work	
together	to	ensure	that	such	cases	are	investigated	and	prosecuted.	This	co-operation	is	a	two-
way	street.	Section	11(1)(d)	of	the	EACC	Act	provides	that	the	EACC	may	recommend	to	the	
ODPP	the	prosecution	of	any	acts	of	corruption,	violations	of	codes	of	ethics	and	any	other	
offences	prescribed	under	Kenyan	law.	Equally,	the	ODPP	Act	(2013)	stipulates,	in	Section	5(2),	
that	the	Director	of	the	ODPP	may	direct	an	investigative	agency	(such	as	the	EACC)	to	conduct	
investigations	over	a	matter.102	
The	department	of	economic,	international	and	emerging	crimes	within	the	ODPP	deals	
specifically	with	corruption	and	other	economic	crimes.103	This	department	also	has	divisions	
that	deal	with	organised	crime,	extradition	and	international	co-operation.104	These	divisions	
can	play	a	crucial	role	in	prosecuting	IFFs	resulting	from	transnational	crimes.	The	ODPP	has	
developed	anti-corruption	prosecution	guidelines	for	prosecutors	handling	corruption	cases,	
which	enhances	the	efficiency	of	the	ODPP	in	prosecuting	corruption	cases.105	
The	ODPP	also	reviews	evidence	of	economic	and	financial	crimes	submitted	by	other	
investigative	agencies,	such	as	the	Directorate	of	Criminal	Investigations	and	the	Banking	Fraud	
Investigation	Unit.106	In	2016,	the	Directorate	of	Criminal	Investigations	conducted	two	
inquiries	relating	to	the	alleged	mismanagement	of	public	funds	meant	for	the	Kenyan	team	
that	took	part	in	the	Rio	Summer	Olympic	games.107	Upon	perusal,	the	ODPP	found	that	one	of	
the	inquiries	related	to	the	offences	of	stealing	and	money	laundering	and	therefore	instituted	
                                                
101	 Article	157(6)	of	the	Constitution.	
102	 Section	5(2)(b)	of	the	EACC	Act.	
103	 ODPP	(2016)	at	10.	
104	 ODPP	(2016)	at	10.	
105	 ODPP	(2017)	at	12.	
106	 ODPP	(2016)	at	2.	
107	 ODPP	(2016)	at	2.	
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criminal	proceedings	against	the	suspects.108	
3.5.3	 The	Judiciary	
The	role	of	the	judiciary	in	fighting	IFFs	lies	in	deciding	cases	brought	before	it	in	accordance	
with	the	law.	If	the	law	is	unclear,	judges	have	the	freedom	to	infer	the	original	intentions	of	
the	legislators.109	If	the	law	is	silent	on	the	issue,	judges	refer	to	the	general	principles	of	law.110	
Deficiencies	in	legislative,	regulatory	and	institutional	frameworks	impede	the	ability	of	African	
countries	to	curb	IFFs.111	Judicial	precedents	become	an	important	source	of	law	on	IFFs	where	
the	law	is	absent	or	ineffective.112	
The	Kenyan	Judiciary	is	committed	to	ensuring	that	all	the	anti-corruption	and	
economic	crimes	cases	brought	before	courts	are	dealt	with	impartially,	
expeditiously	and	in	accordance	with	the	law	and	the	evidence	presented.113	
In	2015,	the	then	Chief	Justice	of	Kenya,	Justice	Willy	Mutunga,	established	the	Anti-Corruption	
and	Economic	Crimes	Division	of	the	High	Court	to	adjudicate	all	disputes	relating	to	corruption	
and	other	economic	crimes.114	
3.5.4	 Parliament	of	Kenya	
The	Parliament	of	Kenya	is	a	constitutionally	established	body	that	comprises	the	National	
Assembly	and	the	Senate.115	Parliaments	have	three	broad	functions:	legislative,	oversight	and	
representative.	Parliament	uses	its	legislative	function	to	ensure	that	there	are	strong	laws	in	
place	to	curb	corruption	and	other	economic	crimes.	This	role	involves	promoting	the	
ratification	and	domestication	of	regional	and	international	instruments,	such	as	UNCAC	and	
the	AU	Convention.	
                                                
108	 ODPP	(2016)	at	2.	
109	 Amiraghdam	et	al	(2016)	at	58.	
110	 Amiraghdam	et	al	(2016)	at	58.	
111	 HLP	(2015)	at	71.	
112	 See	Amiraghdam	et	al	(2016)	at	64:	“The	role	of	jurisprudence	cannot	be	ignored	and,	in	a	sense,	judicial	
decisions	are	the	source	of	life	in	the	law.”	
113	 Maraga	(2018),	available	at	https://www.judiciary.go.ke/7582-2/	(visited	2	February	2019).	
114	 The	Kenya	Gazette	Notice	No	9123.	
115	 Article	93(1)	of	the	Constitution.	
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The	Parliament	of	Kenya	uses	its	oversight	role	to	hold	the	government	accountable	for	
its	actions	and	to	ensure	that	the	government	operates	within	an	ethical,	transparent	and	
accountable	legal	framework.116	Parliament	exercises	this	function	through	holding	regular	
parliamentary	hearings,	participating	in	budgetary	processes,	operating	oversight	committees	
and	exposing	parliamentarians	guilty	of	corruption.117	The	oversight	role	of	parliament	should	
extend	to	the	industries	that	are	particularly	susceptible	to	IFFs,	such	as	the	extractive	industry.	
Moreover,	this	role	should	not	be	limited	to	the	government.	It	should	extend	to	the	judiciary	
and	the	private	sector.	
In	fulfilling	their	representative	responsibility,	members	of	parliament	need	to	promote	
ethical	standards	and	adhere	to	the	highest	standards	of	integrity.	This	will	go	a	long	way	in	
restoring	the	faith	of	the	citizens	in	an	institution	perceived	as	one	of	the	most	corrupt	in	many	
parts	of	the	world.118	
Members	of	the	Kenyan	Parliament	also	have	a	responsibility	to	engage	
parliamentarians	in	other	regions,	since	IFFs	are	a	regional	problem	that	requires	a	regional	
approach	to	eliminate	it.	The	Kenyan	Parliament	has	representatives	in	the	African	
Parliamentary	Network	on	Illicit	Financial	Flows	and	Tax	(APNIFFT)	and	the	African	
Parliamentarian	Network	against	Corruption	(APNAC).	These	fora	provide	members	of	
parliament	with	opportunities	to	discuss	issues	of	IFFs	and	corruption	and	enhance	their	
capacity	and	knowledge	to	make	substantive	laws.	
3.5.5	 Asset	Recovery	Agency	
The	Asset	Recovery	Agency	(ARA)	is	a	semi-autonomous	body	established	under	the	office	of	
the	Attorney-General.119	Its	main	functions	relate	to	the	implementation	of	Parts	VII	to	XII	of	
the	Proceeds	of	Crime	and	Anti-Money	Laundering	Act,	which	encompass	criminal	forfeiture,	
civil	forfeiture,	preservation	and	forfeiture	of	property,	production	orders,	the	criminal	assets	
                                                
116	 Chêne	(2017)	at	3.	
117	 Chêne	(2017)	at	3.	
118	 Transparency	International	(2017b)	at	5.	
119	 Section	53	of	the	Proceeds	of	Crime	and	Anti-Money	Laundering	Act.	
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recovery	fund	and	international	assistance	in	investigations	and	proceedings.120	
The	Act	provides	that	“the	Agency	shall	have	all	the	powers	necessary	or	expedient	for	
the	performance	of	its	functions”	but	does	not	specify	what	those	powers	are.121	The	ARA	is	an	
important	institution	in	curbing	IFFs	from	Kenya	as	it	seeks	to	ensure	that	stolen	assets	are	
repatriated	to	the	country.	
3.5.6	 Multi-Agency	Task	Team	
The	Multi-Agency	Task	Team	(MAT)	was	established	in	November	2015	and	is	composed	of	
representatives	of	the	ODPP,	the	Ethics	and	Anti-Corruption	Commission,	the	National	
Intelligence	Services,	the	Kenya	Revenue	Authority,	the	Directorate	of	Criminal	Investigations	
and	the	ARA,	amongst	others.122	The	primary	aim	of	MAT	is	to	investigate	and	prosecute	
corruption	and	other	economic	crimes	in	Kenya	through	inter-agency	co-operation	amongst	
institutions	in	the	criminal	justice	system,	the	anti-corruption	commission	and	the	tax	and	
revenue	authority.	MAT	focuses	on	corruption	and	other	economic	crimes,	organised	crimes	
and	criminal	syndicates.123	Inter-agency	co-operation	is	an	important	approach	in	the	fight	
against	IFFs.	The	HLP	Report	recommends	that:	
African	States	should	create	methods	and	mechanisms	for	information	sharing	and	
co-ordination	among	the	various	institutions	and	agencies	of	government	
responsible	for	preventing	IFFs,	with	such	co-ordination	being	led	by	the	country’s	
financial	intelligence	unit.124	
3.6	 Conclusion	
Efforts	to	curb	IFFs	from	Kenya	must	focus	on	establishing	strong,	responsive	and	effective	laws	
and	institutions	that	encourage	citizens	and	companies	to	engage	in	legal	activities.	The	lack	of	
specific	international	and	national	laws	on	IFFs	should	not	be	an	impediment	to	curbing	IFFs.	
This	chapter	has	discussed	how	Kenya	may	use	a	multi-pronged	approach,	centred	on	anti-
corruption	laws	and	institutions,	to	curb	IFFs	and	repatriate	stolen	assets.	Anti-corruption	laws	
may	be	used	to	prevent	corruption	and	criminalise	corrupt	acts	which	facilitate	IFFs.	Anti-
                                                
120	 Section	54(1)	of	the	Proceeds	of	Crime	and	Anti-Money	Laundering	Act.	
121	 Section	54(2)	of	the	Proceeds	of	Crime	and	Anti-Money	Laundering	Act.	
122	 ODPP	(2016)	at	4.	
123	 ODPP	(2016)	at	4	
124	 HLP	(2015)	at	82.	
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corruption	laws	may	be	used	also	to	curb	the	commercial	and	criminal	component	of	IFFs.	Anti-
corruption	institutions	ensure	that	anti-corruption	laws	are	implemented.	The	role	played	by	
the	different	anti-corruption	institutions	in	curbing	IFFs	include	investigation,	prosecution,	
adjudication	and	repatriation	of	stolen	assets.	This	chapter	has	noted	also	the	importance	of	an	
inter-agency	approach	to	curbing	IFFs	since	IFFs	are	a	multifaceted	problem.	
However,	without	an	effective	implementation	strategy,	these	laws	and	institutions	are	
useless.	Corruption	is	still	the	greatest	threat	to	implementation	of	anti-corruption	laws.	It	
weakens	law	enforcement	agencies	and	institutions	charged	with	implementing	anti-corruption	
efforts.	As	discussed	by	Ayogu	&	Gbadebo-Smith,	“anti-corruption	laws	and	institutions	are	
entrapped	in	the	virtuous	and	the	vicious	cycle	between	good	governance	and	corruption”.125	
Strong	laws	and	institutions	enable	anti-corruption	efforts,	but	corruption	also	weakens	the	
legal	system.126	According	to	Sandgren,	“a	weak	legal	system	encourages	the	use	of	informal	
law	which	is	a	breeding	ground	for	corruption”.127	Thus,	efforts	to	curb	corruption	in	Kenya	
should	focus	also	on	changing	public	perceptions	and	behaviour.	A	shift	in	attitude	is	a	long-
term	process	which	involves	inculcation	of	public	confidence	in	the	rule	of	law	through	
educational	initiatives	and	media	discussions	on	anti-corruption	efforts.	
Lastly,	those	seeking	to	curb	IFFs	and	corruption	should	take	care	not	to	focus	solely	on	
the	role	of	anti-corruption	laws.	Sandgren	notes	that	there	are	laws	such	as	those	that	provide	
for	transparency,	accountability,	checks	and	balances,	tax	reforms,	a	merit-based	system	for	
officials,	privatisation	and	competition	law	which	have	no	direct	bearing	on	corruption	but	are	
necessary	elements	for	reducing	the	risks	of	corruption.128		
	
	
	
                                                
125	 Ayogu	&	Gbadebo-Smith	(2015)	at	296.	
126	 Sandgren	(2005)	at	724.	
127	 Sandgren	(2005)	at	724.	
128	 Sandgren	(2005)	at	726.	
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CHAPTER	FOUR	
	
CONCLUSION	AND	RECOMMENDATIONS	
	
	
4.1	 Conclusion	
This	paper	has	discussed	the	role	of	anti-corruption	laws	and	institutions	in	curbing	IFFs	from	
Kenya.	Taking	direction	from	the	HLP	Report	on	IFFs	from	Africa,	this	study	found	that	abusive	
commercial	practices,	criminal	activities	and	corruption	are	the	main	sources	of	IFFs	from	
Kenya.	Abusive	business	practices	such	as	tax	avoidance,	tax	evasion,	transfer	mispricing	and	
trade	misinvoicing	have	led	to	substantial	illicit	outflows	from	Kenya,	which	have	diverted	
resources	away	from	the	country’s	sustainable	development	goals.	Criminal	activities	in	Kenya	
contribute	significantly	to	IFFs	because	criminals	intend	to	hide	their	illegal	profits	from	law	
enforcement	agencies.	
This	paper	has	paid	particular	attention	to	the	relationship	between	corruption	and	IFFs.	
In	order	to	analyse	this	relationship,	the	paper	began	by	examining	the	different	approaches	to	
defining	IFFs	and	discussing	the	normative,	legalistic,	developmental	and	the	“no	definition”	
approaches.	It	was	also	important	to	distinguish	IFFs	from	related	concepts,	such	as	illicit	
finance,	capital	flight,	money	laundering	and	informal	flows.	The	study	found	that	there	is	no	
agreed	definition	of	IFFs.	The	lack	of	theoretical	clarity	on	what	comprises	IFFs	poses	a	
challenge	not	only	for	understanding	the	concept	of	IFFs	but	also	for	estimating	the	volume	of	
assets	Kenya	is	losing	to	IFFs.	Proper	definition	is	key	to	understanding	IFFs,	their	effects	on	
development	and,	ultimately,	the	most	appropriate	measures	for	curbing	them.	The	paper	
adopted	the	normative	approach	to	defining	IFFs	which	recognises	that	illicitness	is	not	
synonymous	with	illegality.	The	paper	further	endorsed	definitions	that	have	a	broad	outlook	
on	the	adverse	effects	of	IFFs.	
On	the	relationship	between	corruption	and	IFFs,	this	study	found	that	there	exists	a	
causal	nexus	between	the	former	and	the	origins,	growth	and	consequences	of	the	latter.	This	
finding	confirmed	the	main	hypothesis	of	the	paper:	that	corruption	plays	an	overarching	role	
in	facilitating	IFFs.	Corruption	is	a	source	of	IFFs.	Proceeds	of	corrupt	acts,	such	as	
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embezzlement,	grand	corruption	and	bribes,	make	up	some	of	the	illicit	funds	that	criminals	
transfer	out	of	a	country.	Corruption	facilitates	abusive	commercial	practices	by	lowering	the	
chances	of	detection	and	increasing	prospective	returns.	MNCs	bribe	tax	authorities,	lawyers,	
auditors	and	accountants	to	ensure	that	the	public	is	not	aware	of	the	illicit	commercial	
practices.	Corruption	remains	a	key	catalyst	of	transnational	criminal	activities.	Transnational	
crime	is	driven	by	the	need	to	make	illegal	money.	Corrupt	acts	ensure	that	criminal	networks	
engage	in	illegal	activities	without	interference	from	law	enforcement	agencies.	Lastly,	
corruption	impedes	the	implementation	of	anti-corruption	and	anti-IFF	measures,	which	
further	frustrates	any	efforts	to	curb	IFFs	from	Kenya.	It	is	clear,	therefore,	that	corruption	and	
IFFs	together	pose	a	fundamental	challenge	to	domestic	resource	mobilisation,	weaken	good	
governance	structures,	erode	public	trust	in	government	institutions,	and	undermine	
international	confidence	in	Kenya.	
This	paper	then	considered	what	role	anti-corruption	laws	and	institutions	can	play	in	
curbing	IFFs	from	Kenya.	It	found	that	Kenya	has	a	laudable	legal	and	institutional	anti-
corruption	framework.	The	country	has	ratified	UNCAC	and	the	AU	Convention.	It	also	has	
enacted	several	laws	that	directly	or	indirectly	assist	in	the	country’s	anti-corruption	and	anti-
IFF	efforts.	These	laws	play	an	important	role	in	curbing	IFFs	since	there	is	no	specific	
international	or	national	law	on	IFFs.	The	study	established	that	anti-corruption	laws	help	to	
curb	IFFs	by	preventing	corruption,	criminalising	corrupt	acts,	assisting	in	the	recovery	of	stolen	
assets,	and	setting	up	structures	that	support	international	co-operation.	It	is	important	to	note	
that	this	study	does	not	limit	the	role	of	anti-corruption	laws	to	the	corruption	component	of	
IFFs.	Anti-corruption	laws	have	provisions	that	can	be	used	directly	or	indirectly	to	curb	the	
commercial	and	criminal	components	of	IFFs.	Lastly,	anti-corruption	laws	provide	the	legal	
foundation	for	institutions	that	help	implement	the	laws	and	anti-IFF	strategies.	
This	study	has	shown	that,	despite	Kenya	having	an	extensive	anti-corruption	legal	
framework,	the	incidence	of	corruption	remains	high	in	the	country.	The	study	highlighted	
some	key	challenges	to	Kenya’s	efforts	to	curb	IFFs	using	the	existing	legal	and	institutional	
frameworks.	Firstly,	IFFs	remain	a	complex	problem	that	is	still	subject	to	debate	among	experts	
regarding	its	conceptualisation.	The	complexity	is	occasioned	by	the	fact	that	IFFs	are	caused	by	
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a	variety	of	factors	and	influenced	by	a	mosaic	of	actors	who	have	interests	varying	from	
running	seemingly	legal	profit-making	transactions	to	obvious	illegal	ventures.	
Secondly,	and	closely	related	to	the	complexities	of	defining	IFFs,	are	the	difficulties	in	
estimating	the	precise	volumes	of	IFFs	from	Kenya.	The	HLP	Report	noted:	
The	difficulties	in	estimation	arise	from	the	very	nature	of	IFFs,	which	by	definition	
are	mostly	hidden	and	therefore	difficult	to	track.	As	a	result,	data	are	not	usually	
available	nor	can	the	accuracy	of	existing	data	be	easily	verified	due	to	additional	
and	well-known	difficulties	of	generating	good	statistics	on	the	continent.1	
The	challenge	of	estimating	the	volumes	of	IFFs	from	Kenya	becomes	even	more	serious	when	
one	attempts	to	assess	the	volumes	lost	because	of	corruption.	For	instance,	one	of	the	
research	limitations	of	this	study	is	the	lack	of	empirical	data	relating	to	corruption	among	
multinational	corporations,	which	suggests	significant	under-reporting	of	this	crime.	It	is	no	
wonder	that	most	people	across	Africa	argue	that	the	volumes	of	IFFs	related	to	corruption	are	
far	higher	than	the	projected	five	per	cent	in	the	HLP	Report.2	
Thirdly,	corruption	remains	the	main	primary	impediment	to	implementing	anti-
corruption	laws.	The	vicious	cycle	between	decline	of	good	governance	and	corruption	
undermines	the	efficiency	of	anti-corruption	laws	and	institutions.3	
The	lack	of	capacity	of	anti-corruption	institutions	to	implement	anti-corruption	laws	is	
the	fourth	challenge	to	curbing	IFFs	from	Kenya.	IFFs	are	a	complex	problem	that	requires	
adequate	financial,	technological	and	human	capacities	to	confront	and	curb.	Unfortunately,	
Kenyan	anti-corruption	institutions	are	not	equipped	adequately	to	curb	IFFs.	The	EACC,	for	
instance,	lacks	the	required	human	resources	capacity	to	fulfil	its	mandate.4	The	HLP	Report	
also	highlights	this	challenge,	noting	that:	
the	incapacities	of	African	countries	to	combat	IFFs	was	reflected	at	various	levels	
such	as	the	lack	of	accurate	data	and	up-to-date	information,	inadequate	
understanding	of	the	various	mechanisms	used,	and	absent	or	ineffective	legislative,	
regulatory	and	institutional	frameworks.5	
                                                
1	 HLP	(2015)	at	32.	
2	 HLP	(2015)	at	32.	
3	 Ayogu	&	Gbadebo-Smith	(2015)	at	296.	
4	 Odhiambo	(2016)	at	50.	
5	 HLP	(2015)	at	71.	
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Lastly,	the	absence	of	political	commitment	to	curb	IFFs	from	Kenya	has	affected	
negatively	the	efficiency	of	anti-corruption	laws	and	institutions.	This	study	has	highlighted	
several	corruption	scandals	that	involve	key	political	figures	in	Kenya.	Sadly,	investigations	and	
prosecutions	of	most	of	these	scandals	remain	pending.	Law	enforcement	agencies	cite	political	
interference	as	one	of	the	main	reasons	why	these	corruption	cases	have	not	been	concluded.	
4.2	 Recommendations	
4.2.1	 Strengthen	Anti-Corruption	Laws	
Law	is	one	of	the	most	effective	means	of	curbing	IFFs	from	Kenya.	Strong	laws	make	it	difficult	
for	criminals	and	rogue	MNCs	to	move	funds	illicitly	and	hide	these	funds	from	authorities.	
Anti-corruption	laws	should	focus	on	curbing	IFFs	through	prevention,	criminalisation	and	
facilitating	asset	recovery	and	international	co-operation.	They	also	should	form	a	strong	
foundation	for	the	institutions	tasked	with	implementing	them.	
This	paper	recommends	that	Kenya	should	assess	its	anti-corruption	laws	and	identify	
any	shortcomings	that	may	limit	the	ability	of	these	laws	to	curb	IFFs.	For	instance,	Parliament	
should	amend	ACECA	to	include	elements	of	corporate	criminal	liability,	which	is	important	in	
curbing	IFFs	within	the	private	sector.	Parliament	should	engage	experts	when	amending	these	
laws	or	drafting	new	laws	to	ensure	that	there	are	no	loopholes	that	criminals	may	abuse.	
The	government	should	domesticate	the	hortatory	provisions	of	UNCAC,	especially	
those	that	are	important	in	curbing	IFFs.	For	instance,	Article	12	of	UNCAC,	which	provides	for	
preventive	measures	within	the	private	sector,	ought	to	become	part	of	Kenyan	law.	
Domestication	ensures	that	the	provisions	of	UNCAC	become	locally	applicable	and	
enforceable.	
Further,	the	government	should	focus	on	developing	soft	laws,	such	as	codes	of	ethics,	
for	the	public	and	private	sectors.	Soft	laws	are	important	in	establishing	consensus	on	issues	
and	serve	as	an	important	first	step	in	the	codification	of	norms.	In	particular,	this	paper	
recommends	that	the	government	encourage	professional	bodies,	such	as	those	in	charge	of	
accountants,	auditors	and	lawyers,	to	develop	codes	of	ethics	for	their	members.	An	example	of	
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such	a	code	is	the	Pan-African	Lawyers	Union	Code	of	Ethics	on	Anti-corruption	and	
Professional	Compliance	Standards	for	Lawyers	Working	in	Africa.6	
4.2.2	 Enhance	the	Capacity	of	Anti-Corruption	Institutions	
This	paper	recommends	the	strengthening	of	anti-corruption	institutions	to	ensure	that	they	
properly	implement	anti-corruption	laws.	This	involves	increasing	the	financial,	human	and	
technical	resources	available	to	these	organisations	to	enable	them	to	deal	with	crimes	related	
to	IFFs.	Also,	anti-corruption	institutions	should	focus	on	enhancing	the	technical	capacity	of	
their	staff	members	in	the	areas	of	financial	investigation,	record	keeping	and	data	analysis.	
The	government	should	broaden	the	mandate	of	some	anti-corruption	institutions.	This	
will	ensure	that	they	can	deal	appropriately	with	a	broad	range	of	crimes	related	to	IFFs.	For	
instance,	the	mandate	of	the	EACC	should	be	expanded	to	include	prosecutorial	powers	so	it	
can	prosecute	IFFs	related	to	corruption.	The	government	also	should	merge	anti-corruption	
and	anti-money	laundering	measures	to	avoid	duplicating	the	mandate	of	anti-corruption	
institutions	and	to	ensure	optimum	utilisation	of	resources.	
Institutions	and	individuals	seeking	to	curb	IFFs	should	engage	the	courts.	This	study	has	
shown	that	some	IFFs	from	Kenya	already	violate	existing	anti-corruption	laws.	Courts	are	
important	anti-corruption	institutions	which	provide	legal	recourse	for	these	violations.	A	good	
example	in	this	regard	is	the	recent	decision	of	the	High	Court	of	Kenya	to	nullify	Kenya’s	
Double	Tax	Avoidance	Agreement	with	Mauritius	because	it	was	unconstitutional.7	Courts	also	
could	provide	legal	guidance	on	the	contentious	issues	relating	to	IFFs,	for	instance,	by	guiding	
anti-corruption	institutions	on	the	most	appropriate	definition	of	IFFs,	based	on	the	country’s	
laws	and	judicial	precedents.	
This	study	recommends	also	that	the	government	should	broaden	the	mandate	of	the	
multi-agency	task	team.	IFFs	are	a	multifaceted	problem	that	requires	a	multi-pronged	
approach	and	inter-agency	co-operation	among	institutions	in	the	criminal	justice	system,	the	
                                                
6	 Pan-African	Lawyers	Union	(2019),	available	at	https://lawyersofafrica.org/po/code-of-ethics/	(visited	7	
April	2019).	
7	 Tax	Justice	Network-	Africa	v	Cabinet	Secretary	for	National	Treasury	&	2	others	[2019]	at	para	43.	
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anti-corruption	commission,	and	the	tax	and	revenue	authority.	This	would	ensure	that	the	
government	utilises	the	strengths	of	the	various	institutional	mandates	jointly	to	investigate	
and	prosecute	crimes	related	to	IFFs	and	recover	stolen	assets.	
4.2.3	 Build	Structures	that	Promote	International	Co-operation	
Co-operation	with	foreign	bodies	and	governments	is	key	to	curbing	IFFs	from	Kenya.	Kenya	
should	utilise	the	provisions	of	UNCAC	and	other	laws	on	international	co-operation,	focusing	
specifically	on	regulatory,	investigative	and	asset	recovery	mechanisms.	As	proposed	by	Chowla	
&	Falcao,	Kenya	should	sign	bilateral	and	multilateral	agreements	with	different	governments	
to	enhance	the	level	of	co-ordination	amongst	the	different	institutions	in	the	different	
jurisdictions.8	International	co-operation	will	mitigate	the	hurdles	that	anti-corruption	
institutions	face	when	seeking	information	from	foreign	jurisdictions.	Moreover,	these	
institutions	can	obtain	easily	the	technical	help	and	logistical	support	they	need	to	curb	IFFs	
effectively.	
4.2.4	 Enhance	Public	Participation	
Kenya	can	implement	anti-corruption	laws	successfully	if	the	government	engages	non-state	
actors	such	as	civil	society,	the	media,	the	private	sector	and	the	citizenry.	Non-	state	actors	can	
endorse	or	discredit	reports	issued	by	anti-corruption	institutions.	This	would	help	in	exposing	
the	corruption	impeding	the	efficiency	of	these	institutions.	More	importantly,	non-state	actors	
can	create	political	will	among	politicians	and	leaders	to	care	about	the	consequences	of	IFFs.	
As	Ayogu	&	Gbadebo-Smith	note:	
Politicians	do	not	create	political	will.	They	respond	to	it.	It	is	the	governed	or	those	
who	consent	to	be	governed	who	should	align	the	political	fortunes	of	the	policy	
makers	to	the	consequences	of	IFFs.9	
	
	
	
                                                
8	 Chowla	&	Falcao	(2016)	at	3.	
9	 Ayogu	&	Gbadebo-Smith	(2015)	at	296.	
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